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LAND ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS
Michael Heller∗ & Rick Hills∗∗
Eminent domain for economic development is both attractive and appalling. States need the power to condemn because so much land in America
is inefficiently fragmented. But public land assembly provokes hostility
because vulnerable communities get bulldozed. Courts offer no help. The
academic literature is a muddle. Is it possible to assemble land without
harming the poor and powerless? Yes. This Article proposes the creation
of Land Assembly Districts, or “LADs.” This new property form solves the
age-old tensions in eminent domain and shows, more generally, how careful redesign of property rights can enhance both welfare and fairness. The
economic and moral intuition underlying LADs is simple: when the only
justification for assembly is over-fragmentation of land, neighbors should
be able to decide collectively whether their land will be assembled. Our legal theory solution is equally simple: use property law to retrofit communities with a condominium-like structure tailored to land assembly. Let’s try
giving those burdened by condemnation a way to share in its benefits and
to veto projects they decide are not worth their while.

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he time has come for legislatures to stop denouncing eminent domain while governments continue to condemn land.1 States
should face up to the fundamental tension that makes eminent domain
both attractive and appalling. From an efficiency standpoint, we need
eminent domain to consolidate overly fragmented land. But such
land assembly often works a distributive injustice on the owners
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗
∗∗

Lawrence A. Wien Professor of Real Estate Law, Columbia Law School.
William T. Comfort, III Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
We thank the many colleagues who contributed to puzzling through LADs at the Chicago,
Harvard, and Stanford Law and Economics Workshops; Boalt, BU, Colorado, Columbia, UCLA,
and USC Faculty Workshops; the NYU Law School Colloquium on Innovation Policy; and the
William & Mary Conference on Property Rights and Economic Development. In particular, we
thank Bob Ellickson, Susan French, Henry Hansmann, Louis Kaplow, George Keating, Mark
Kelman, Dan Klerman, Jim Krier, George Lefcoe, Mark Lemley, Larry Lessig, Tom Merrill,
Stephen Munzer, Mitch Polinsky, Eric Posner, Carol Rose, Mike Schill and Steve Shavell. We
received expert research assistance from Benjamin Yaster and Sally Peacock. Thanks to the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford and to the Cook Endowment for
Legal Research at the University of Michigan Law School for support of Heller’s and Hills’s
work, respectively.
1 See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (forthcoming August
2008) (locating the LADs experiment in its broader social and political context).
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whose land is taken. How do we get the efficiencies of land assembly
without unfairly enriching developers who receive land at condemnees’ expense?
This Article proposes an experiment for legislatures to venture —
the solution of Land Assembly Districts, or “LADs.” The function of
LADs is to unify property interests without expropriating from property owners. LADs can solve the dilemma of eminent domain and,
more generally, show how careful redesign of property rights may enhance both welfare and fairness.2
Until now, most observers have assumed that solutions to land assembly must be based either on private contracting or public intervention. With private voluntary contracting, holdouts lead to underassembly.3 Developers may attempt to assemble land secretly, but
negotiations frequently collapse when owners discover that each is a
monopoly supplier as to the undivided land. On the other hand, eminent domain, which is the public intervention route, leads to capricious
redistributions.4 Because landowners are entitled only to the “fair
market value” of their land, not to any of their subjective surplus
or any of the assembly value, landowners bitterly fight condemnation.
They fight even where the value of land assembly to the public
exceeds its costs to the condemnees. Failure to pay landowners the
true value of land assembly can cause (1) the government to ignore
those costs, leading to inefficient overassembly, or (2) the private
landowner to fight land assembly too vociferously, leading to wasteful
underassembly.
To get a sense of the values at stake, consider the recent assembly
and condemnation of a dozen buildings housing fifty-five businesses on
a seedy part of Times Square. New York City handed over the site on
Eighth Avenue between 40th and 41st Streets to the New York Times
Company for the “fair market value” of $86 million. Based on several
standard valuation methods, the assembled value that private developers would have paid for that site would have been as much as three
times higher.5 While the dollar gap is large, the values implicated by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2 See generally Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law
of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999) (showing the benefits that flow from uncoupling efficiency and fairness in takings law).
3 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 639, 673–74 (1998) (describing underuse caused by
fragmentation and holdouts); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 907, 926–29 (2004) (same).
4 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 86 (1986)
(describing this effect of eminent domain).
5 Paul Moses, The Paper of Wreckage, VILLAGE VOICE, June 25, 2002, at 34 [hereinafter
Moses, The Paper]; see also Paul Moses, The Times’ Sweetheart Deal, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 24–
30, 2004, at 16.
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eminent domain are not only, or even primarily, financial. Consider
another example: in Detroit during the 1980s, General Motors threatened to leave town unless the city promptly condemned and handed
over the Poletown neighborhood.6 GM got the land quickly and
cheaply, but Detroit never explained to the thriving neighborhood why
their interests should be so capriciously sacrificed for the common
good, and no market test ever showed that the transfer was even efficiency-enhancing on its own terms.
The $150 million discrepancy in value for part of one Times Square
block and the bare-knuckle politics behind the razing of Poletown illustrate the stakes in using eminent domain for land assembly, but
these are not isolated cases. There are hundreds of examples worth
billions of dollars of this controversial nationwide phenomenon.7
Land assembly is a critical issue because, across America today, urban land is often broken up into unusably small parcels. Land sits idle
in a tragedy of the anticommons — the wasteful underuse caused by
too-abundant entitlement holders.8 The challenge is to solve this tragedy without creating another tragic outcome, expropriating the homes
and businesses of existing entitlement holders who are often poor and
vulnerable. This type of dilemma, where there is no good mechanism
to bridge the gap between the individual scale of ownership and the
socially optimal use of land, is just where property law innovation can
prove most useful.
Enter the Land Assembly District. The economic and moral intuition underlying the LAD is simple: persons who hold a legal interest in
a neighborhood’s land should collectively decide whether the land
ought to be assembled into a larger parcel. Our legal theory solution is
equally simple: property law can retrofit a community with a condominium-like structure tailored to solve the problem of land assembly.
To allow people to overcome collective action barriers that might otherwise prevent them from selling their neighborhood, the LAD places
them in a special district with the power, by a majority vote, to approve or disapprove the sale of the neighborhood to a developer or
municipality seeking to consolidate the land into a single parcel.
Unlike voluntary transactions between individual owners and a private land assembler, the LAD’s decision avoids holdout problems by
requiring the landowners to make their decision through some sort of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 465–71 (1981) (Ryan,
J., dissenting).
7 The Institute for Justice, Kelo’s pro bono counsel in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005), maintains a detailed listing of uses (or abuses, depending on your point of view) of
eminent domain for land assembly. See Castle Coalition, Eminent Domain Map, http://
maps.castlecoalition.org (last visited March 8, 2008).
8 See generally Heller, supra note 3 (introducing anticommons theory).
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collective voting procedure. Unlike eminent domain, the residents
controlling the LAD would have a veto over whether or not to proceed
with land assembly: if the municipality or developer does not offer a
price satisfactory to the LAD’s constituents, then the assembly of land
would not go forward.
LADs create a mechanism by which neighbors can bargain effectively for a share of the neighborhood’s “assembly value” — its value
after the fragmented interests are united into a single parcel — and not
merely the value of each lot before land assembly. By giving
neighbors a chance to get a share of the land’s assembly value, LADs
help enlist them to be supporters of land assembly whenever such an
assembly really will have a higher value than the neighborhood that it
will replace. Moreover, it is not difficult to design LADs in such a way
that individual owners within a LAD have the right to opt out and receive the full, existing measure of constitutional protection (that is,
condemnation based on fair market value) if they are dissatisfied with
the bargain struck by the LAD. Thus, LADs can be designed so each
individual is at least as well off as under current law and most are
substantially better off.
Given these benefits of LADs, is there any reason to use traditional
eminent domain at all? We argue that LADs make eminent domain
unnecessary when the problem is simply the assembly of fragmented
land. For instance, if the state has authorized the creation of LADs,
then eminent domain for the economic redevelopment of “blighted”
neighborhoods ought to be forbidden, unless “blight” is defined narrowly to include only neighborhoods that impose extraordinary external costs on outsiders, because the only function of such eminent domain is assembly of overfragmented land. By contrast, eminent
domain still has a role to play where the problem is acquiring unique
sites for traditionally public infrastructure — say, the only feasible site
for a highway or airport or a uniquely noisome parcel of land. In
these cases, LADs provide no solution to the problems of bilateral monopoly that would arise if monopolistic landowners were to negotiate
with a monopsonistic government.
Our solution understands the assembly value of land as a commonpool resource — any landowner can obstruct its creation. We argue
that, as a general matter, the best solution to a breakdown in collective
action is not the application of outside expertise but support for selfgovernment by the affected parties. Thus we reject the traditional solution to such a tragedy of the anticommons, a call for the Leviathan:
disinterested experts employed by a larger-scale government who figure out what the parties would have done were they capable of contracting or self-government. Indeed, the dominant proposals in the legal literature for reforming eminent domain have followed this script,
relying on the promise of legal or economic expertise. For instance, legal scholars occasionally call for measures of “just compensation” that
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would approximate the landowners’ subjective valuations.9 Likewise,
there is periodically a call to revive the constitutional requirement that
condemnations serve a “public use.”10 Both of these solutions overestimate the power of expertise and underestimate the potential of selfgovernment.
The owners’ subjective valuations of their own land are by definition best known (and therefore best revealed or concealed) by the
landowners themselves, as opposed to experts. Likewise, the public
use solution improbably assumes that judges are better at calculating
the public benefits of land assembly than developers and politicians,
groups whose particular expertise is discerning and catering to the desires of consumers and voters. The LAD is an institution through
which the interested parties themselves, landowners and land assemblers, can determine whether the game of land assembly is worth the
candle.
One can view LADs in a larger context by comparing them to other
forms of group property that have radically transformed the management of analogous common-pool resources. For example, the condominium form took a hop through Puerto Rican law into mainstream
American law in the early 1960s and has since become ubiquitous.11
More recently, thousands of “business improvement districts” (BIDs)
have sprung up following the passage of state enabling regulations.12
The voluminous literature on the governance of a wide variety of limited-access common-pool resources, ranging from forests to groundwater, has repeatedly suggested that they flourish best when the users
have mechanisms of self-government that enable them to overcome
collective action problems.13 LADs illustrate the principle that selfgovernment, not expert government, is the best way to control a limited-access commons — in this instance, to manage the struggle for the
assembly value of fragmented land.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9
10

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55–61 (7th ed. 2007).
See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 161–81 (1985); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of
Kelo v. City of New London, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 171 (2005).
11 See Horizontal Property Act of 1958, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1291–1293k (1993 & LexisNexis Supp. 2005); Robert G. Natelson, Condominiums, Reform, and the Unit Ownership Act,
58 MONT. L. REV. 495, 500 (1997) (describing the historical origins of condominiums).
12 See Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time?: Business Improvement Districts and
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 366–74 (1999) (describing the rise of BIDs and their
general legal structures); Brian R. Hochleutner, Note, BIDs Fare Well: The Democratic Accountability of Business Improvement Districts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 374, 374–76 (2003) (same).
13 See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 742–49 (1986) (discussing successful examples of group
management of limited-access commons resources).
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To be sure, LADs face distinctive challenges that condos, BIDs, gas
and oil unitization, and other forms of retrofitted group property do
not face.14 In these existing group property forms, the owners typically have homogeneous interests and engage in repeated interactions.
By contrast, our proposal for LADs faces the daunting prospect of
heterogeneity and a one-shot deal. This combination is perhaps the
most difficult challenge for any new group property form. If LADs
can work — and we think they can — then it is difficult to imagine
another intermediate-level collective action problem that could not
be solved by our method of property law entrepreneurship and
experimentation.
Part II frames the problem; Part III proposes our LAD solution;
and Part IV tweaks the solution to address some problems of
neighborhood power that our solution might raise. Finally, Part V
shows why it is not so radical after all to think that people can solve
problems of land assembly for themselves if the law gives them the
right tools.
II. THE LANDSCAPE BEFORE LADS
This Part explores the legal landscape that informs our approach to
LADs. First, we rehearse the theoretical arguments for why existing
methods of land assembly are both unfair and inefficient. Second, we
support these arguments against the existing approaches with a brief
survey of the failed experiment with urban renewal from the 1950s to
the 1970s. Both theory and history caution against recent efforts to
cure “blighted” neighborhoods with eminent domain.
A. The Defects of Private Land Assembly
Absent strategic behavior by landowners, the ideal method of land
assembly would be to require the assembler to secure the consent of
the landowners whose land is sought for a larger parcel. When a land
assembly goes forward on this basis, one can be reasonably confident
that it enhances social welfare because the landowners would not sell
unless the assembly surplus exceeded the owners’ valuations of their
properties. These valuations would include peculiar values not reflected in market value, such as the landowner’s sentimental attachment to the land or special adaptations to the particular site that generate producer or consumer surplus for the landowner (for instance,
location near longtime customers).
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14 On the dilemmas of contracting for oil unitization, see Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 87 (1984).

2008]

LAND ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS

1473

The familiar collective action problem arises, however, as soon as
the landowners realize that a purchaser is attempting to assemble a
larger parcel by combining several smaller lots. After the land assembler has purchased a part of the planned larger parcel, the assembler
becomes locked into purchasing the rest of it to avoid duplicating the
site-specific investment at another site. Thus, existing owners become
monopoly suppliers of the assembled land.15 Knowing that the assembler requires each of their parcels, every owner may seek to be the last
to sell, and then to hold out for all of the extra value created by the assembly. With several such holdouts, negotiations collapse because the
assembler, of course, cannot pay the entire surplus to each owner.
Empirical confirmation of such holdout problems is plentiful and
colorful.16 Tales are legion of speculators who swoop in to purchase
options on lots of land from less informed owners as soon as they get
wind that the parcels lie in the boundaries of an impending assembly.
Even where developers successfully assemble land by using dummy
corporations and shill buyers, the transaction costs of the assembly are
so high that only a small fraction of the most valuable projects go forward. Knowing ex ante that up-front costs will be high and impasse is
likely, potential assemblers seek extraordinary returns or make alternative investments. On many city blocks, competing developers and
holdouts may play a waiting game that lasts for decades.17 Under this
regime, predictably, too little land is assembled.
This is not to say that voluntary land assembly is always doomed
to failure. There are rare examples in the United States in which a
group of owners has come together to initiate its own land assembly
without any formal property institution to structure its dealings or
economize on transaction costs. As Professors Robert Ellickson and
Vicki Been note, homeowners are reasonably well placed to put informal pressure on their holdout neighbors to accept a good deal from a
developer for a group of properties and to pressure the local government for the necessary zoning changes and permits.18 In a rare case
that worked, one of the participants noted: “[t]he real story is how you
manage to get 144 people to agree to let three of their neighbors negotiate the sale of their homes.”19 Likewise, Professors Gideon Parcho–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15 See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 957, 971–72
(describing power of individual landowners to hold out in a “thin market” situation); Merrill, supra note 4, at 75 & n.49 (describing the problem of landowners becoming monopoly suppliers and
providing examples).
16 See, e.g., ANDREW ALPERN & SEYMOUR DURST, HOLDOUTS! (1984) (cataloguing
lengthy negotiations and costly modifications of buildings to accommodate landowners holding
out for a piece of assembly surplus).
17 See id.
18 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 853–54 (3d ed. 2005).
19 Id. at 854.
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movsky and Peter Siegelman chronicle the tale of how the American
Electric Power Company (AEP) purchased the entire town of Cheshire, Ohio, from its residents.20 Professors Parchomovsky and Siegelman attribute the absence of holdouts to the residents’ shared interest
in maintaining a sense of community: as more residents agreed to sell
their homes, this sense unraveled, leading the balance of residents to
sell at a discount.21
But the rarity of the voluntary approach suggests its limits: its vulnerability to holdouts, to other coordination difficulties, and to the
need to reinvent from scratch a costly administrative and negotiating
process. Moreover, the sale of Cheshire, Ohio, is hardly a success
story. Because they had no mechanism for collective action, the residents of Cheshire could not plan a coordinated method for evaluating
AEP’s offers or assessing whether their individual decisions would actually preserve the community whose sale they were assessing.22 In
short, uncoordinated individual action results in holdouts that
obstruct cost-justified sales or in panic sales that hinder retention of
community.
B. The Defects of Eminent Domain
As an alternative, assemblers pressure local governments to condemn land on their behalf. Eminent domain overcomes the holdout
problem, but only at the expense of introducing other fairness and efficiency concerns. The difficulty with eminent domain is that it must
substitute a court’s objective valuation for a value determined by the
parties’ bargaining. But the administrative costs of judicial valuation
require courts to choose crude measures of value — for instance, “fair
market value” (meaning the court’s estimate of the value that a willing
buyer would pay a willing seller for the particular parcel at its highest
and best use on the open market).23 Such measures of value necessarily fail to give landowners the same compensation that they would
have demanded in a fully voluntary transaction.24 In this purely de–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
20 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals
in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2004).
21 Id. at 122–24.
22 See id.
23 See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“Because of serious
practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular property at a given
time, we have recognized the need for a relatively objective working rule. . . . The Court therefore
has employed the concept of fair market value to determine the condemnee’s loss. Under this
standard, the owner is entitled to receive ‘what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller’ at the time of the taking.” (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)) (citing
United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949))).
24 See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 82–86; Steven J. Eagle, Privatizing Urban Land Use Regulation: The Problem of Consent, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 905, 915 (1999) (“[G]iven that the destruction of subjective value almost always occurs in eminent domain proceedings, ‘just compen-
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scriptive sense, we can say that eminent domain “undercompensates”
landowners. (We explore in the next sections whether this undercompensation should be regarded as a normative problem.)
1. Undercompensation. — Consider two sources of undercompensation that are built into the concept of fair market value. First, landowners frequently derive some sort of consumer or producer surplus
from their lots that is higher than the price the average buyer would
pay for the parcel.25 Homeowners might build up sentimental attachments to property simply by living in it. They develop ties to
neighbors through connections at local churches, favorite coffee shops,
bars, clubs, or other familiar local watering holes — what some have
called “social capital.”26 These connections can enable neighbors to
overcome collective action problems more easily in monitoring crime
or pressuring government for help in maintaining neighborhood quality. Homeowners also change the property to suit their unique tastes
with expensive but eccentric modifications that are not reflected in the
market price. Shopowners build up connections to regular customers
who patronize the shops through habit and because of their convenient
location. Fair market value does not include any compensation for
such lost subjective value.27 One way to understand what it means
when a landowner says property is “not for sale” is that the owner’s
subjective value in the land is higher than its fair market value.
Second, with a caveat, fair market value does not include any of
the enhancement of value resulting from the land assembly itself.28
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
sation’ is hardly ever ‘full compensation.’”); Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in
Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 26 (2006) (“[Subjective] values are difficult to quantify. . . . [E]xisting owners
have an incentive to inflate their selling prices opportunistically to augment their own compensation. . . . As a result, in calculating just compensation for any taking, courts ignore the actual
valuations of existing landowners.” (footnotes omitted)); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of
Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 679 (2005)
(“Fair market value excludes, for example, consequential damages and compensation for any of
the real but subjective harms suffered by the property owner.”).
25 See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (“[L]oss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it,
like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship.”).
26 See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
27 See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Many
owners are ‘intramarginal,’ meaning that because of relocation costs, sentimental attachments, or
the special suitability of the property for their particular . . . needs, they value their property at
more than its market value (i.e., it is not ‘for sale’).”). State statutes, however, sometimes go beyond what the Fifth Amendment requires, for example, by compensating for lost business goodwill. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 123–24 (2006).
28 See Miller, 317 U.S. at 375 (“[Compensation] cannot be enhanced by any gain to the
taker. . . . [S]pecial value to the condemnor as distinguished from others who may or may not pos-
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This assembly surplus can be considerable: a quarter-acre parcel in a
rundown residential neighborhood might be worth a small fraction of
a quarter-acre parking lot next to a glittering new festival mall.
2. Is Undercompensation Unfair? The Question of Distributive
and Corrective Justice. — Is such “undercompensation” unfair? We
believe that no general answer is possible to this question of distributive justice: as we explain below, the answer will depend on the contingent facts of each condemnation. But the very contingency of the
question indicates something deeply wrong with our current system of
eminent domain. Eminent domain invariably relies on “one-size-fitsall” formulas — for instance, “fair market value” — to reduce administrative costs.29 This emphasis on simple formulas is the inevitable result of eminent domain’s procedures, which include no method for encouraging neighbors and land assemblers to bargain honestly, thereby
revealing their true preferences concerning land assembly.30 The result
is an administratively cheap but ethically crude system that ignores
most of the context-specific concerns relevant to distributive justice.31
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
sess the power to condemn, must be excluded as an element of market value.” (citations omitted)).
There is one setting in which a property owner might be entitled to some of the assembly value.
The owner has to show that a private developer could realistically have assembled the land, and
created the incremental value, within a reasonable time at a reasonable price without the use of
eminent domain. Consumers Power Co. v. Allegan State Bank, 202 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Mich.
1972). However, the incremental value cannot be established by introducing evidence of private
offers for the land or for neighboring sites that never closed and that contained unusually restrictive conditions tantamount to the offers’ being call options. Mauldin v. Hous. Auth. of Marietta,
477 S.E.2d 317, 318–19 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). We thank Professor George Lefcoe for bringing this
example to our attention.
29 See United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979) (listing various
“working rules” and “practical standards” courts usually apply in eminent domain cases, regardless of the idiosyncrasies of underlying facts).
30 Statutes authorizing eminent domain typically require the assembler to make a good-faith
offer for the voluntary purchase of the property sought to be condemned. See 6 JULIUS L.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.13[1][a] (3d ed. 2006). But the requirement is
almost never judicially enforced to limit eminent domain. Id. This lack of judicial enforcement is
hardly surprising given the evidentiary difficulty of proving lack of good faith in an initial offer.
31 We sidestep the more general question of whether government should ever pay any compensation to landowners whose land is confiscated for land assembly. The traditional academic criticism of the obligation is that government does not routinely compensate persons for losses incurred as a result of other legal transitions — for instance, when government repeals a tax
exemption or prohibits a previously legal activity. Why should losses resulting from the compensation of land be any different? See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986). If landowners are averse to the risk of governmental
confiscation, they can purchase insurance against the possibility of confiscation. See Lawrence
Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV.
569, 572 (1984). Any government subsidy for such insurance would predictably lead to the moral
hazard of landowners ignoring the risk of confiscation when they build on their property, erecting
inefficiently large structures in the face of impending freeways and airports. Kaplow, supra, at
602–03; Blume & Rubinfeld, supra, at 622–23.
The familiar riposte to these arguments is that confiscation is especially demoralizing to
landowners, not because it creates uncertainty but because it is perceived by landowners as being
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(a) The Fairness of Denying Condemnees Any Share of the Assembly Surplus. — Consider, first, whether landowners ought to receive
any share of the increased value resulting from the land assembly itself. Conventional wisdom suggests that landowners do not deserve
any share of such gains because they do not create the assembly. The
Supreme Court has held that landowners do not deserve to receive a
windfall from the beneficial activities of government simply because
their land stands in the path of progress.32
There are, however, at least two objections to such a position.
First, failure to pay over some share of the assembly value to condemnees deprives them of value that landowners normally retain.
Private landowners selling their land in a voluntary transaction ordinarily bargain not merely for the opportunity costs of replacing their
home, but also for any appreciation of value resulting from general
market or community conditions. We will assume that the ordinary
social understanding of ownership is the benchmark for defining distributive justice.33 With this benchmark in mind, one might regard
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
unjust. This special demoralization might result from the sense that confiscation of specific assets
defines a closed class of specifically identified persons. Unlike the people who happen to lose as a
result of a generally applicable regulatory scheme, the person whose land is taken might feel especially aggrieved or vulnerable by being targeted by the state for no more ethically plausible reason
than the location of his or her land. The Court seems to have held that laws burdening such
“closed classes” of people are more susceptible to challenge as regulatory takings than general legislation that identifies a more open category of burdened persons. See generally E. Enters. v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). Because this demoralization cost has nothing to do with uncertainty,
Professors Fischel and Shapiro argue that insurance would not eliminate the welfare loss resulting from demoralization: the landowner would be just as demoralized by the need to pay an insurance premium. William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269
(1988).
For the purposes of this Article, we take as given the obligation of the government to pay
compensation to landowners when the government confiscates or permanently occupies their
land. This obligation, after all, is well ensconced in constitutional text and doctrine, as well as
social mores. As a matter of practical policymaking, the right to compensation is not going away
any time soon. The only issues on the table are the details: how, and how much.
32 Miller, 317 U.S. at 377.
33 Thus, we do not offer any “comprehensive” theory of distributive or corrective justice as a
standard by which to assess “market value” as a measure of compensation. Instead, we infer
some less abstract principles from popular intuitions about what constitutes just treatment of persons whose land is confiscated by the government.
For those who seek more comprehensive theories to explain social practices, this “mid-level”
approach to theory will seem unsatisfying. Certainly, a more “top-down” comprehensive approach that deduced the theory from some master value — for instance, welfare maximization —
would be more parsimonious in its premises. Such an approach, however, might rest on the illusion that there is a persuasive free-standing theoretical platform, independent of our actual social
practices, on which a theorist can make a convincing stand: why, for instance, should anyone believe that there is a duty to maximize welfare? If one has a more pragmatist view, there is nothing
but the ladder: kick it away, and one simply falls outside the domain of normal social discourse.
Occam’s Razor may be fine as one theoretical commitment among many. Use it too often, however, and one may end up giving oneself a philosophical lobotomy.
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the denial of such a bargaining right to condemnees as distributionally
unjust: they are deprived of the ordinary perquisites of ownership
simply because their land lies in the path of a highway or shopping
mall.
This apparent injustice is especially stark when noncondemned
land abutting the assembly project appreciates in value as a result of
that project, yet government makes no effort to recover such appreciation through any sort of benefits charge. The landowner whose land
was condemned for the project gets only a fraction of the value that
the abutting landowner receives, even though the former actually
made some contribution to the project.34 It was precisely this perception of injustice that led several states during the mid-nineteenth century to abandon the “benefit-offset” rule in assessing compensation to
farmers whose land was condemned for railroads.35 Of course, this
problem of morally arbitrary redistribution could be solved by special
assessment districts that stripped both abutting landowners and condemnees of the windfall resulting from the assembly project.36 But
governments very rarely attempt such recovery, perhaps because the
administrative costs of measuring the marginal increase in value of
abutting land would be too high. The result is that failure to pay
any share of the gains from assembly to condemnees leads to a
morally arbitrary redistribution of wealth from condemnees to abutting landowners.
Second, it is an error to suppose that landowners make no contribution to the success of land assembly beyond giving up their land.
The speed with which land is condemned depends critically on the attitude of the condemnees. If they are highly litigious or politically obstreperous, they can delay the condemnation and run up the legal costs
of the land assembler. If they are more cooperative and trusting of the
government, condemnation can go forward much more quickly. By
denying cooperative landowners any share of the assembly gains, the
system of eminent domain provides no reward to landowners who actually help create those gains through cooperative behavior.
(b) The Fairness of Denying Condemnees Their Subjective Valuation. — Quite apart from the possibility that landowners might deserve some share of the assembly surplus, eminent domain typically
denies condemnees any compensation for lost consumer or producer
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
34 See Miller, 317 U.S. at 375, 376–77 (stating rules that just compensation is determined at
the commencement of a taking, but that any lands condemned after the taking has been planned
receive compensation according to their changed value at the time of this second decision).
35 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 83–
84 (1995).
36 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 18, at 630–34 (discussing special assessment districting in the form of business improvement districts).
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surplus above fair market value.37 A normal attribute of ownership is
the right to hold out for a sale price that will leave one in as good a
position as before the sale. Eminent domain obviously strips the condemnee of this perquisite. It is well known that landowners tend to
value their own land above the market value.38 To the extent that
eminent domain is supposed to achieve this sort of corrective justice by
placing condemnees in the position that they would have occupied but
for the condemnation, “fair market value” is an unjust measure of
compensation.39
Courts and commentators typically justify the exclusion of subjective valuation as a way to reduce the administrative costs of the condemnation system.40 Because eminent domain has no reliable mechanism for eliciting the true valuation of landowners, any consideration
of subjective valuation would be an invitation to perjury. Moreover,
one might argue that landowners’ tendency to place a higher valuation
on their land than does the market is the result of a transitory “endowment effect” that creates an “offer/ask” disparity.41 Humans have
a well-verified psychological inclination to value their current endowments more than identical items that they currently lack but could
purchase: they will pay more to avoid losing an item than they will to
acquire the identical item.42 Thus, a landowner will ask for more to
give up a house she currently occupies than she will offer to purchase
the identical house in the identical neighborhood. If this endowment
effect amounts to nothing more than a temporary preference for the
status quo, then one might regard it as irrational or transitory, since
preferences will change as soon as the status quo does. If, in the long
run, the landowner will be just as satisfied with the substitute housing
to which he relocates as he is now with his condemned house, then
market value might seem an adequate measure of compensation.
(There is some evidence that the endowment effect diminishes as people gain more experience with buying and selling.)43 Such an aversion
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
37 See Miller, 317 U.S. at 375 (noting that the land’s particular suitability to the buyer or seller
“must be disregarded . . . in arriving at ‘fair’ market value”).
38 See Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988); Fennell,
supra note 15, at 963; Garnett, supra note 27, at 107–09; Merrill, supra note 4, at 83.
39 See Coniston Corp., 844 F.2d at 464; EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 182–86; POSNER, supra
note 9, at 55–61.
40 See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1979); Richard A. Epstein,
The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62 n.167 (1988); Kelly, supra note 24, at 25–26.
41 See FISCHEL, supra note 35, at 207–09; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H.
Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON.
1325 (1990).
42 See Kahneman et al., supra note 41.
43 See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227 (2003).
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to change, without any connection to the actual characteristics of one’s
current or future situations, might not plausibly justify an increase in
compensation because taxpayers themselves may suffer from a similar
endowment effect regarding their incomes. If they do, then it would
make no sense to protect landowners’ attachment to their real estate
endowments, for such protection would undermine a similar attachment of taxpayers to their current level of cash.44 In short, one might
defend the use of “fair market value” on the ground that it is simply
too costly to determine landowners’ long-term, “genuine” subjective
valuation of their land.
These arguments, however, assume that the only procedure for determining subjective valuation is that traditionally used in eminent
domain proceedings. This procedure makes heavy use of expert testimony, but has no mechanism (beyond the penalties of perjury) for encouraging neighbors to state honestly their valuation of their land.
Similarly, the procedure lacks a mechanism for encouraging neighbors
to engage in any collective deliberation concerning the value of their
neighborhood. Many landowners will value their current land more
highly precisely because they know and value their current neighbors,
who might be social friends or reliable customers.45 Each landowner,
therefore, needs to know whether those other landowners will remain
in the neighborhood in order to come to some reliable long-term estimate of her own valuation of her parcel. Eminent domain procedures
reject all such efforts at neighborhood democratic deliberation in favor
of judge-managed expertise.
The result, predictably, is that consideration of the neighbors’ subjective valuation of their neighborhood might be prohibitively costly.
However, if different procedures could gauge subjective valuation
more cheaply and effectively, there is little doubt that such procedures
would be more just, as measured by the goals of corrective justice already implicit in the system of just compensation.
3. Is Undercompensation Inefficient? — Quite apart from the
question of fairness, there is the additional difficulty of whether eminent domain sends to government and private condemnees an accurate
signal of the relative value of preserving the status quo or assembling
fragmented ownership patterns.46 Under one (in our view, excessively
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44
45

FISCHEL, supra note 35, at 209–10.
See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 20, at 116 (discussing the “social capital” of
friendships, and the value they add).
46 One might ask whether government needs such a fiscal signal to ensure that it adequately
considers constituent interests. Ordinarily, government has an adequate signal of constituent interests simply through the process of democratic elections. The claim is occasionally made, however, that governmental decisionmakers ignore nonfiscal costs, at least when they are experienced
by a minority of constituents. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 56–61. As Professor Daryl Levinson notes, the difficulty with such a theory of “fiscal illusion” is that we do not normally assume
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rosy) theory, the requirement that government pay just compensation
can be regarded as a way to improve the political process by which
land assembly decisions are reached, regardless of whether one regards
condemnees as politically weak or politically powerful. If condemnees
are politically weak because they are numerically insignificant, poor, or
both, then the government’s obligation to pay just compensation gives
municipal government a fiscal incentive to take their interests into account, because the majority will have to feel the pain of increased
taxation necessary to compensate the condemnees.47 On the other
hand, if such landowners are politically effective because the concentrated costs that they face give them an incentive to overcome collective action problems and lobby city hall to avoid loss of their land,
then just compensation should reduce the intensity of their opposition
to just the right level. At this level, cost-justified land assembly should
move ahead because the primary opponents have been bribed to step
aside.48
Just compensation, however, does not really indemnify landowners
for the true cost of eminent domain. The result is that incentives to
use or forgo eminent domain are skewed. Government and private
land assemblers have an incentive to overuse eminent domain when
landowners are politically ineffective. Politically effective landowners
have reason to object excessively to eminent domain, possibly deterring its use even when it is necessary.
Consider the first danger: that government will overuse eminent
domain. As Professor Thomas Merrill notes in his important article,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
that government will ignore regulatory benefits experienced by private parties unless the government can recover those benefits through fees or benefits charges. Why, then, should we assume
that government will ignore regulatory burdens absent some fiscal incentive to take them into
account? See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 377 (2000).
It is worth noting, however, that local government policies seem to take greater care to
compensate private persons for the costs of confiscating private property (through payment of just
compensation) and the private benefits of bestowing public property (through recapture of infrastructure benefits with special assessments and other benefits charges). Perhaps government takes
greater care in spreading both the costs and benefits of infrastructure precisely because these
benefits are so clearly focused on specific, geographically identified individuals. Where the victims and beneficiaries of governmental action constitute such a clearly delineated class, the dangers of rent-seeking and majoritarian exploitation are heightened.
47 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“Together [the public use and just compensation requirements] ensure stable property ownership
by providing safeguards against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government’s eminent domain power — particularly against those owners who, for whatever reasons, may be unable to protect themselves in the political process against the majority’s will.”); Daniel A. Farber,
Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 137 (1992)
(“[B]ecause the legislature will usually offer compensation voluntarily, the takings clause can be
defended as a barrier against a serious form of discrimination against politically disfavored
groups.”).
48 Merrill, supra note 4, at 85–88.
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The Economics of Public Use, private land assemblers have an incentive to lobby for eminent domain even when there is little danger of a
holdout problem, simply because the inadequate measure of just compensation ensures that the assembler need not pay the landowners any
share of the assembly value or even the landowners’ true loss.49
Merrill argues that such “secondary rent-seeking” ought to be discouraged through more intensive judicial review where “one or a small
number of persons will capture a taking’s surplus,” but he offers no
further elaboration of how to identify situations in which such heightened scrutiny is warranted.50 One is left with the uneasy impression
that secondary rent-seeking could be ubiquitous enough to swallow
Merrill’s general argument in favor of judicial deference to eminent
domain.
By contrast, consider the opposite possibility — that landowners
are politically effective.51 The measure of just compensation offered
by eminent domain provides them with no incentive to collaborate
with government in land assembly. At the very best, they will receive
fair market value, which likely undercompensates many of them. Because they cannot receive any share of the assembly value, landowners
are indifferent to whether land assembly turns out to be a success or a
failure. The predictable result is that landowners hire a lawyer on a
contingency fee basis to fight fiercely for the maximum possible delay
of land assembly. It is frequently argued that condemnees deserve no
share of the assembly value because they are merely “passive participants” who do nothing to assist in the process of land assembly but involuntarily supply the factor of land.52 This argument, however, forgets that landowners need not be passive: they can do much to hasten
or delay the pace of a land assembly through litigation, demonstrations, and sheer political muscle. By giving them no incentive to promote a project, the market value measure of just compensation makes
it likely that they will actively oppose it.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
49
50
51

See id. at 87.
Id.
The assumption that homeowners, at least, will tend to be effective and extremely vocal
participants in the local land use political process is supported by WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001). Briefly, the “hypothesis” of the title is that homeowners will
pay careful attention to local regulatory burdens and local tax and spending levels because these
governmental actions will tend to be capitalized into the value of their homes, depressing or increasing this value depending on whether the governmental actions are on net beneficial or harmful to local properties. Because homeowners cannot insure against value loss resulting from bad
regulation, they tend to be risk-averse, opposing any risky governmental action that could cause
them to lose their equity. This risk-aversion is expressed by surprisingly well-informed and intense levels of local political participation by homeowners, or, as Professor Fischel calls them,
“homevoters.”
52 Merrill, supra note 4, at 86 (describing the condemnor as the “active agent, the supplier of
the idea and initiative”).
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C. No Easy Fixes Within Eminent Domain
Of course, there might be easy ways to solve the problems of eminent domain that would not require the creation of new institutions. It
is possible that changing compensation practice or increasing judicial
supervision of condemnations would solve the core dilemmas of eminent domain. But we doubt it.
1. New Compensation Formulas Do Not Reveal Which Neighborhoods Should Be Condemned. — A government might try to use voluntary payments of money above fair market value to buy off bitter
landowner opposition to eminent domain. But this expedient assumes
what the case for eminent domain denies — namely, that holdout
problems and strategic behavior by landowners will not bog down negotiations for a voluntary solution. Having only eminent domain and
voluntary transactions with which to gauge landowners’ valuation of
their neighborhood, government has no institution by which to get an
accurate appraisal of what an unassembled neighborhood — the status
quo — is really worth.53
One might also try to solve the problems of distributive and corrective justice by uniformly increasing the measure of compensation from
fair market value to some higher amount, which would presumably reflect the margin by which landowners value their own land above
market value. Nevertheless, a problem with such a uniform “kicker”
would remain: it would be uniform. It would ignore the distinction
between vibrant neighborhoods from which neighbors derive high subjective value and neighborhoods composed of transients with little interest in preserving their mutual social ties. These proposals replace
arbitrary undercompensation in some cases with arbitrary overcompensation in others.
Likewise, one might increase the measure of compensation so that
owners of condemned land share in its assembly value. But there is no
algorithm for calculating what share of the assembly value condemned
landowners “ought” to receive. Horizontal equity would require that
landowners be treated the same as their neighbors. But this would require the often prohibitively expensive process of assessing the proposed project’s benefit to all abutting land, whether condemned or uncondemned, with either confiscation of all such assembly value from
everyone through special assessments or award of such value to the
condemnee. In short, fair market value might be the best that we can
do in eminent domain proceedings.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
53 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 871, 887–90 (2007) (describing additional flaws in the current just compensation “regime”
that lead to under- and overcompensation due to defects in the bargaining and litigation process).
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Professors Amnon Lehavi and Amir N. Licht offer an innovative
reform of eminent domain to increase the condemnees’ share of the assembly surplus.54 Their proposal, however, would simply increase
compensation; it would do nothing to improve the decision about
whether or not to condemn any given neighborhood. Under their proposal, condemnees would have the option of accepting shares in a special-purpose development corporation that would take title to the assembled parcel of land. The value of the corporation’s shares,
therefore, would reflect the gains from assembly, and the condemnees
could share in these gains when they sold their stock. But Professors
Lehavi and Licht would not give the condemnees any power to stop
the condemnation altogether if their neighbors believed that the assembly gains were smaller than the value of the land as an ongoing
neighborhood. As they note, they “do not question whether eminent
domain should be exercised for promoting large-scale . . . projects.”55
Thus, the Lehavi-Licht proposal does nothing to improve the efficiency of the initial decision about whether and where to condemn.
Neighbors inhabiting a vibrant and viable community would still face
the eminent domain bulldozer even though they valued their ongoing
community more than the public would profit by a proposed mall or
casino. Improving this decision about whether to condemn land is
precisely the problem posed by the disaster of urban renewal.
The point of criticizing “fair-market-value-plus-some-percentage”
as the measure of compensation is not to improve the details of eminent domain but rather to raise the possibility of eliminating it altogether. If there were some other procedure for overcoming holdout
problems that was administratively cheap but also gave landowners
their subjective valuation of land — that is, their actual valuation of
land — and gave them some share of assembly value equal to that of
their neighbors, then such a procedure would be superior to eminent
domain. It would be fairer and more efficient. The central question
for those seeking sensible land assembly, therefore, is whether such a
device could exist.
In answering this question, it is essential to keep one central issue
always in mind: all of the criticisms of eminent domain offered above
are criticisms of process as much as result. The problem is not only
that the law often chooses the wrong number. The problem is that the
law has no process for taking into account the right considerations —
for instance, the peculiar values that neighbors place on their particular communities. The solution to the problem, therefore, should
probably be institutional rather than substantive — a solution that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
54
55

Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704 (2007).
Id. at 1734.
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creates a new form of governance rather than a new formula for
compensation.
2. Judicial Deference: Right Answer, but Wrong Question. — Much
of the literature surrounding eminent domain revolves around whether
courts should more aggressively control condemnations by barring
condemnations that do not (in the judge’s opinion) serve a “public
use.”56 In theory, it is well-settled law that the U.S. Constitution’s
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit the federal and state
governments to condemn land unless the condemnation serves some
public use.57 State constitutions (either as written or as construed by
state courts) often contain similar requirements.58 In practice, the
great majority of courts defer to the political decisionmakers’ assessment about whether some proposed land assembly serves a public
use.59
Part of the reason for such deference is doctrinal incoherence:
courts are not at all clear about what exactly a public use is. The idea
seems to be that a public use is a use that predominantly benefits the
public at large rather than the private party seeking the land assembly.60 Such a requirement might imply that the proposed land assembly must be necessary to produce a public good in the economic sense
of the term.61 Some state courts have gone further to suggest that the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56
57

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) (applying
“public use” requirement to states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
58 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19 (“Private property may be taken or damaged for public
use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or
into court for, the owner.”); KY. CONST. § 13 (“[N]or shall any man’s property be taken or applied
to public use without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being
previously made to him.”); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1, § 10 (“And whenever the public exigencies
require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive
a reasonable compensation therefor.”); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7(a) (“Private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.”).
59 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487–90 (2005); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239–43 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954); Moskow v. Boston
Redev. Auth., 210 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Mass. 1965); Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of N.Y.
Auth., 190 N.E.2d 402, 404–06 (N.Y. 1963). But see County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d
765, 779–87 (Mich. 2004).
60 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241 (holding that state may not take property only for another’s
private use, but may take property if it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”);
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (citing Clark v. Nash, 198
U.S. 361 (1905)) (“In discussing what constitutes a public use [the Clark Court] recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test.”).
61 See EPSTEIN, supra note 10, at 166–69; Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An
Essay in Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 7 (1994) (“As far as the
public use requirement is concerned, the economic theory of public goods provides both a justification and a limit. The justification is that the government needs to be able to acquire the inputs
that are necessary to provide public goods for which the market cannot easily provide. The limit
is set by the consideration that any private use of the power of eminent domain will be inefficient
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proposed land use actually be owned or comprehensively regulated by
the government if the condemned land is not “blighted.”62 The broad
principle underlying the public use requirement, however, could be
construed as a rule that the courts need to prevent private land assemblers from using eminent domain for what Professor Merrill calls “secondary rent-seeking” — that is, cheap acquisition of land through lowballing the condemnee.63 The implicit premise behind calls for stricter
enforcement of the public use requirement is that private land assemblers have too much power relative to private landowners.
There are several legal difficulties with such calls for stronger judicial enforcement of public use requirements.64 However, as a matter
of sensible policy, the deeper objection to the debate over the public
use requirement is that it is simply beside the point. Judicial deference
to the political process may indeed be the right answer — but it is an
answer to the wrong question.
At best, a tough public use requirement simply ensures that government does not condemn more land than necessary. But, as noted
above, it could be the case that we have too little land assembly. As
several commentators have noted, government rarely uses eminent
domain because potential condemnees often have sufficient clout to
stop such efforts or make them extraordinarily costly.65 Eminent do–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
since it produces a result that private parties were not able to reach by bargaining.” (footnote
omitted)).
62 See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (describing three situations in which transferring condemned property to a private entity satisfies the “public use” requirement: “(1) where ‘public necessity of the extreme sort’ requires collective action; (2) where the property remains subject to
public oversight after transfer to a private entity; and (3) where the property is selected because of
‘facts of independent public significance,’ rather than the interests of the private entity to which
the property is eventually transferred” (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 477–81 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting))).
63 See Merrill, supra note 4, at 87.
64 As Professor Jed Rubenfeld notes, the literal text of the Fifth Amendment does not justify
such judicial limitation of eminent domain: the “public use” clause is a limit on government’s obligation to pay compensation, not a limit on its power to condemn land. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078–80, 1096–97 (1993). The precedents also do not unambiguously
favor tougher enforcement of limits on eminent domain: although some state courts have hinted at
more vigorous “public use” requirements in their state constitutions, see, e.g., Manufactured Hous.
Communities of Wash. v. State, 13 P.3d 183, 188–90 (Wash. 2000) (relying on the difference in the
texts of the state and federal constitutions to conclude that “Washington courts . . . forbid the taking of private property for private use even in cases where the Fifth Amendment may permit such
takings”), the federal precedents of Berman and Midkiff remain good law governing the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.
65 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
531, 605 (2005) (“Given the high cost of eminent domain litigation for the government — both in
monetary and political terms — the government will often choose to secure consensual agreement
over going to court. Thus, the eminent domain power is likely to be invoked only where there is a
large surplus to be obtained through public ownership of the property and where there are significant and costly barriers to successful negotiations.”); Merrill, supra note 4, at 80 (“[C]asual observation suggests that when governments acquire interests in land they prefer, if possible, to do so
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main gives none of the participants — government officials, private
land assemblers, or landowner-condemnees — the right incentives to
oppose or support eminent domain with the correct level of intensity.
As a result, eminent domain might give private condemnees too much
incentive to oppose eminent domain, with the result that we have too
little land assembly. Judicial policing of eminent domain does nothing
to solve this problem.
Aside from being irrelevant to the problem posed by eminent domain, the arguments in favor of a tougher public use standard fail because of their excessive optimism about courts. The implicit premise
behind all such arguments is that ordinary politicians are corrupted by
private advocates of land assembly into condemning too much or at
least the wrong sort of land.66 But the advocates of heightened public
use requirements have yet to explain why judges and the litigation
process are not also affected by these pressures from “special interests.”
The litigation process, after all, is biased in favor of the well-heeled
and well-organized interests who can contribute to (mostly elected)
state judges’ electoral campaigns and hire good lawyers and stables of
well-paid experts to “spin” judicial opinions that use mushy public use
tests to limit or allow eminent domain. Why will such judicial oversight control eminent domain when political oversight has failed?
The answer to the problems of eminent domain, in short, cannot be
simply better valuation methods or smarter judges: all such solutions
assume the existence of what we palpably lack — namely, some expert
methodology for sorting out when a proposed land assembly is better
(for the “public,” for the various parties to the transaction, for the
world) than the status quo of fragmented land. The premise behind
proposals for heightened judicial scrutiny of eminent domain is that
somehow judges can answer this question with impartial expertise.
However, this premise is just as unfounded as the analogous premise
of advocates for better valuation methods.
The contrary premise of this Article is that expertise is no substitute for self-governance. We need institutions that will encourage the
parties themselves — condemnees and condemnors — to reveal how
much they value the rival uses of fragmented neighborhoods or
assembled land. As we argue below, LADs may be precisely such an
institution.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
by market transactions. Government officials frequently complain about the costs and delays of
eminent domain.”).
66 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 504–05 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that without a stronger “public use” standard, no home or personal property, “however
productive or valuable to its owner,” is secure from private interests “with disproportionate
influence and power in the political process” (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 464 (Fitzgerald, J.,
dissenting))).
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III. AN OUTLINE OF LADS
LADs are essentially a form of special district with the power of
eminent domain over all of the land located within the district’s jurisdiction. The essential purpose of this district is to allow the LAD’s
residents to overcome collective action problems arising from fragmentation of ownership. The LAD accomplishes this task by giving these
stakeholders the collective power to force each member of the LAD to
accept a land assembler’s proposal to buy the neighborhood.
This general proposal opens up a host of questions about the details of LAD design. These details are important: they raise critical
questions about how to balance the goals of individual dominion and
democratic self-government. We address these questions in Part IV.
For now, it is important to avoid getting lost in a tangle of rules.
Therefore, we set forth a rudimentary portrait of LADs, focusing on
(1) how LADs are formed (formation rules); (2) how LADs’ jurisdiction
is defined (jurisdictional rules); and (3) how individual owners can escape from a LAD (exit rules).67 After sketching out these rules, we explain in Part IV how they address the normative shortcomings of eminent domain.
A. Formation Rules
The rules for LAD formation can be divided into four categories:
rules about (1) who would be permitted to propose a LAD; (2) which
government agency would initially approve the LAD; (3) how LAD
proposals would be publicized and negotiated with the neighbors affected; and (4) how LADs would be approved through some sort of
vote of the neighbors. This section provides only a skeletal overview
of these issues, leaving the resolution of difficult questions for section
B below.
1. Who Initiates the LAD? — A LAD promoter, whether resident
or outside assembler, would propose a LAD to city planners, including
its boundaries and proposed uses. The LAD promoter could be anyone — whether a full-time developer or neighborhood activist or
Community Economic Development Corporation — who spies an opportunity in developing underutilized but overfragmented urban real
estate. The opportunity need not be motivated by profit: the promoter
could be a nonprofit organization trying to revitalize an economically
stagnant block. Sometimes a developer will have assembled part of a
block and have a project planned, either to build directly or to sell to
another builder. An enterprising developer may, however, have an option on only some of the land to be assembled. Other times, an entre–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
67 This tripartite framework for analyzing and refining group property forms is developed in
Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 581–602 (2001).
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preneurial resident or neighborhood organization may choose to organize a particularly suitable neighborhood district in the path of development. By marketing itself to developers as assembly-ready, such a
neighborhood would be well placed to capture assembly gains.
Placing the LAD within the planning process gives the municipality a substantial voice in the process and serves to promote transparency. In addition, early involvement by the local authorities gets them
on board for the subsequent planning approvals that determine in
large measure the final value of the site. LADs typically contemplate a
change of use of the land, for example, by way of rezoning to some sort
of “Planned Unit Development” (PUD) zone.68 Thus, it makes sense to
place the issue of LAD formation in the hands of the same governmental body that will make the initial recommendation concerning the site
plan required for PUD rezoning.
BID enabling legislation would serve as the template for much
of this aspect of the governance mechanism, particularly in terms of
establishing the relationship with the municipality, defining LAD
boundaries, establishing a LAD Board, and selecting governing
directors.69
2. Who Oversees LAD Formation? The Public Role. — Because so
much of the value from assembly comes from the rezoning that developers of larger parcels are often able to negotiate, and from the additional scale that the development makes possible, the local planning
commission will be a necessary first step in the process. The steps for
approving the LAD formation are substantially parallel to those involved in existing redevelopment and condemnation procedures. Enabling legislation would require municipal planners to designate areas
where LADs could be attempted, to specify minimum and maximum
areas for LADs, and to determine acceptable purposes.
In particular, the planning commission would have to certify that a
LAD is necessary to overcome the problem of excess fragmentation of
land. Such certification would generally be easy to determine from a
title search showing divided title. Indeed, the inquiry would be selfpolicing, because few developers would gratuitously assume the high
administrative costs of creating a LAD when voluntary transactions
would ensure the assembly of the parcel.
More controversially, the planning commission would have to determine whether the proposed development should be advanced
through eminent domain rather than LADs. As we explain in more
detail below, LADs replace eminent domain as the method of land as–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
68 For a general discussion of planned developments, see DANIEL R. MANDELKER,
TROLLING PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS (1966).
69 See Briffault, supra note 12, at 377–81 (describing BID enabling legislation).
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sembly for a particular category of development — namely, land assembly for the purpose of economic development of “blighted”
neighborhoods. Land assembly for other purposes, such as developing
transportation infrastructure (highways, railroad routes, airports, etc.)
would continue to be governed by eminent domain. We defer defending and defining this distinction, noting only that this boundary between eminent domain and the LAD process would be policed initially
at the formation stage. Also, LADs will require some governmental
determination that eminent domain is not necessary for the proposed
project. In effect, the planning commission, with probable legislative
review by the city council or county commission, must establish the
boundary between LADs and ordinary eminent domain. If the jurisdiction authorizes a LAD, then in effect it is giving a group of
neighbors the right to bargain for the assembly surplus and a veto over
the ordinary, confiscatory form of condemnation — both valuable concessions that give the locality a special seat at the land use table. As
currently proposed, LADs would substitute only for eminent domain
used primarily to promote economic development. It would not necessarily be applicable for highways or other condemnations where the
ultimate user is more “public,” and where it would be difficult to create the market price mechanism that we propose here.
One might ask why a government would have any incentive to prefer LADs over eminent domain. The self-interested local government,
after all, might be keen on retaining for itself as much of the assembly
surplus as possible. Sharing this surplus with the neighbors would reduce the local government’s revenue, especially if the local government
were effectively funding condemnation through a combination of ownsource revenue and grants-in-aid.
This worry about a self-interested underutilization of LADs by the
local government suggests a role for judicial review of planning commission decisions to deny neighbors the use of LADs. However, one
should not exaggerate the likely hostility of local governments to
LADs, because the latter provide politicians with some significant
benefits. In particular, LADs redirect hostility about eminent domain
away from politicians, allowing land assembly without political fallout.
This is no small benefit in a political atmosphere in which eminent
domain is an increasingly embattled concept at both the state and federal levels. By defusing hostility toward eminent domain and avoiding
drastic limits on local governments’ capacity to assemble land, LADs
provide an important service to a local government with overfragmented real estate in its jurisdiction.
3. Negotiations to Final Vote. — To educate the neighbors about
the potential benefits and costs of a LAD, the government would hold
a series of hearings in which the private land assembler could make
the case for land assembly to the neighbors. (Again, the planning
commission would be the natural venue.) Such presentations would
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strongly resemble PUD rezoning hearings — the developer would display 3D cardboard models, sketch plats, and an artist’s rendering to an
audience of neighbors, who would then get an opportunity to comment
on the proposal. The usual procedures would be used to give notice to
affected landowners and tenants — all persons living within a designated number of feet of the proposed LAD would receive some paper
announcements. The planning department staff could also engage in
more aggressive in-person canvassing of neighborhoods to increase attendance where the neighbors might be primarily renters or lowincome households. To the extent that the neighbors were homeowners, however, such efforts would probably be unnecessary, as their
down payments and accumulated equity in their houses alone would
provide sufficient incentive for participation.
At these hearings, one would expect the developer to pitch the
LAD by suggesting how much the proposed land assembly would increase the value of the neighbors’ property and how much the typical
resident could expect to reap from the sale. At this early stage, however, the numbers would have to be nonbinding, for neither the city
nor the developer would have accurate information concerning the
valuation of individual lots or even certainty that the local zoning code
would be amended to allow the project (as it almost certainly would
have to be amended, probably to a PUD designation).
Opposed to the developer would presumably be neighborhood activists — including persons not residing within the LAD areas who
would likely object to the increased congestion costs (traffic, noise,
etc.) resulting from the proposed project. In particular, one would expect tenants’ groups to express worries that the proposed project
would increase their rents (if the project would replace existing housing with more valuable housing) or evict them entirely (if the project
replaced multi-family housing with commercial or office developments). It would be especially important to clarify the role of tenants
in LAD procedures — especially those concerning their share of the
relevant vote of the LAD’s constituents.
4. The Vote. — The catalyzing expression of intra-neighborhood
democracy would be the vote by the residents of the proposed LAD.
Assuming the local government allowed the vote to go forward, the
creation of the LAD would then have to be approved by the LAD’s
residents. Because the LAD process would replace eminent domain
entirely in those cases where only fragmented ownership prevented
land assembly, the neighbors residing in the LAD would have an absolute collective veto on all economic redevelopment requiring coercive
land assembly. If the neighbors refused to approve a LAD, then all
possibility of assembly by any means other than voluntary private assembly would be at an end.
Again, we defer until the next section a defense of the limits LADs
place on eminent domain. For now, it is important only to highlight a
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central and controversial institutional question left open by our LAD
proposal — the proper allocation of voting rights among neighbors
who are given the power to sell or refuse to sell their neighborhood.
LAD legislation creates only a special district with the power to make
a one-shot decision concerning land assembly. Therefore, under the
Supreme Court’s precedents governing local government voting rights,
it is likely (although not certain) that such laws could allocate voting
power among neighbors based on the relative size of their property
holdings within the LAD area rather than on the basis of “one person,
one vote.”70 Thus, persons owning a great deal of property — for example, an entire apartment building — would have many times more
voting power than tenants with title only to leaseholds.
Should voting power be allocated on the basis of property rather
than personhood? We recommend that voting power be allocated on
the basis of property ownership, a position that we defend at greater
length below. The details of such voter definition are obviously critical for the success of the LAD. For now, we note only that LADs, like
other special districts, place pressure on the distinction between private property and public power.
B. Jurisdictional Rules
Once a LAD has been formed, two questions arise concerning the
LAD’s jurisdiction. First, there is the question of whether and to what
extent LADs can preclude all eminent domain. Second, there is the
question of how LADs negotiate for the sale of their neighborhood to a
developer, a sale requiring a second vote by the LAD’s constituents or
their representatives.
1. The Border Between LADs and Eminent Domain. — The first
jurisdictional rule for LADs is that LADs replace eminent domain as
the exclusive means of land assembly in a certain range of situations.
Specifically, LADs replace eminent domain only when land assembly is
blocked by “target fragmentation,” not when the problem is “target
uniqueness.” Target fragmentation results whenever a piece of land
cannot be acquired because ownership of the land is fragmented
among several different landowners. Target uniqueness results when–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70 See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 360, 366–72 (1981) (upholding Arizona water district’s
property-based voting scheme because the powers exercised by the district, including the rights to
“condemn land, to sell tax-exempt bonds, and to levy taxes on real property,” were sufficiently
limited and specialized in scope to be distinguished from general governing authority); Sailors v.
Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 111 (1967) (upholding Michigan school district’s process of selecting
its board because, for “nonlegislative officers, a State can appoint local officials or elect them or
combine the elective and appointive systems” without violating the principle of one person, one
vote). But see Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 692–94, 703 (1989) (striking down the New
York Board of Estimate’s geography-based voting system, in part because the Board exercised
general legislative powers).
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ever a parcel of land is uniquely suited for some particular land use,
such that the next best substitute parcels are much more costly alternatives — for example, where the parcel under consideration is the only
site for a port, highway, or airport that is practically feasible from an
engineering standpoint.
We urge that LADs be the exclusive procedure for land assembly
only where assembly is blocked by target fragmentation. As a practical matter, this means that LADs will replace eminent domain when
the purpose of land assembly is redevelopment of economically or aesthetically underperforming neighborhoods, consolidation of prematurely subdivided land in suburbs, or reconstruction of obsolete infrastructure in aging neighborhoods. In these and like cases, there is no
argument that the land in question is somehow uniquely suited for
some public function beneficial to the community beyond the
neighborhood. Instead, the problem is that some usually drab, nondescript parcel of land suffers from problems of internal governance.
Thus, even if the residents wanted to sell their neighborhood, they
could not do so easily because of the holdout problems created by
fragmentation.71 LADs solve the problem of neighborhood fragmentation, eliminating the rationale for using eminent domain to overcome
the collective action problem of getting unanimous consent from all of
the neighbors.
By contrast, eminent domain would still be used where acquisition
of the site is impeded by target uniqueness. Where one neighborhood,
by some fortuity, controls some unique resource, we suggest that LADs
do nothing to solve either the problem of fairness or that of efficiency
that arise from giving neighbors a veto over land assembly. The situation of such a neighborhood is exactly analogous to the position of a
single landowner who has a monopoly over some resource needed by
the public and who seeks to appropriate all of the assembly value of
the lot for himself simply by exerting his naked power to veto assembly through refusing to sell for a smaller sum.72 The problem of fairness is matched by a problem of efficiency as well. To the extent that
the government is the only purchaser of land uniquely suited for large
infrastructure — usually transportation-related, such as highways, airports, ports, or bridges — the neighborhood and the government will
confront each other as bilateral monopolists.73 The resulting dickering
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
71 See Fennell, supra note 3, at 928–29 (describing the fragmentation holdout problem); Heller,
supra note 3, at 639, 673–74 (similar).
72 See POSNER, supra note 9, at 55, 61; Merrill, supra note 4, at 75–76.
73 See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1558 (1999) (“When the government is trying to buy a specific piece of property, however, it is in a bilateral monopoly with one landowner.”).
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and deception may eat away all of the gains from trade and at least inefficiently delay public works.
Therefore, our proposal contemplates that eminent domain might
still be available whenever the government intends to use eminent domain to construct public infrastructure that cannot be sited elsewhere
except at great cost. In practical effect, LADs would replace eminent
domain whenever the government sought to redevelop some blighted
area but not when the government sought to build public works that
would be difficult to relocate elsewhere. This jurisdictional rule leaves
open two distinct questions: (1) what is the ethical justification for this
distinction between target fragmentation and target uniqueness? and
(2) how do we define the border between two concepts that, in reality,
bleed into each other? We defer both of these issues until the next section, in which we set forth a defense of LADs and argue that they provide the solution to the problems of eminent domain.
Interestingly, the distinction between target fragmentation and target uniqueness tends loosely to correlate with the distinction between
projects that are often said to serve no public use and those that are
uncontroversially considered to be public uses suitable for eminent
domain. Facilities like large, transit-oriented infrastructure tend to be
owned as well as subsidized by the government. Moreover, such projects tend to be regarded as public goods by all but the most diehard
libertarians. As a result, when eminent domain is used to overcome
the problem of target uniqueness, it tends to be the least controversial
as a public use. By contrast, where the purpose of land assembly is
simply to consolidate fragmented land, the process is controlled by
private developers (for example, James Rouse,74 Sam Zell,75 and Mort
Zuckerman76). These developers can make only the weakest case that
the few “blighted” blocks they need for their project are uniquely
suited for their proposed festival market, shopping mall, or entertainment district. Rather, the developer seeks the use of eminent domain
simply because the land is too fragmented to assemble expeditiously
through voluntary transactions. These private developers usually own
or lease the resulting improvements, which are often difficult to defend
as true nonrival, nonexcludable public goods.77 Thus, it is not surprising that this sort of eminent domain is most controversial and is frequently decried as “not a public use.”
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
74 See Neal Peirce, Urban Developer James Rouse: The Great Oak Falls, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Apr. 22, 1996, at B5.
75 See Suzanne Woolly et al., The New World of Real Estate, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 22,
1997, at 78.
76 See Nick Paumgarten, The Tycoon, NEW YORKER, July 23, 2007, at 44.
77 See, e.g., Moses, The Paper, supra note 5 (describing the New York Times Company and
Forest City Ratner’s leasing of space in the New York Times building).
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In a wide range of cases, therefore, LADs can solve the public use
problem. Eminent domain need not be used for the sorts of projects
most likely to be denounced as “not public,” because LADs make eminent domain unnecessary when the only purpose of eminent domain is
consolidation of fragmented land. In effect, LADs occupy the twilight
zone between “public” (eminent domain) and “private” (voluntary
transactions):
TABLE 1. LADs, Between Private and Public

Description

Application

Private Land
Assembly
Owners get
subjective value
(SV) but holdouts
may block creation of assembly
value (AV)

Land Assembly
Districts
LADs more efficient in
ensuring that AV > SV;
also more just because
most neighbors get SV
plus a chance to
bargain for AV

Eminent
Domain
Owners get
fair market
value (FMV);
SV and AV
confiscated by
government or
developer

Only option for
developer if
locality does not
ratify public use
from assembly

Available when land
assembly is blocked by
target fragmentation
— primarily economic
development of
“blighted”
neighborhoods

Allow only
when state
condemns land
uniquely suited
for public use,
as with
infrastructure

2. The LAD’s Power: Auctioning Off the Neighborhood. — Once a
LAD is created by its constituents, what can it do? The answer, in
short, is that it can negotiate to sell the neighborhood. The LAD
would have the power to accept or reject proposals by developers to
assemble the land for some new land use — a festival mall, auto factory, casino, or perhaps simply a nicer version of what it already is, a
mixed residential-commercial district. At this stage of the LAD process, one would expect the land assembler to pony up specific figures on
the total purchase price for the neighborhood and LAD constituents’
share of that price. The shares would be rooted in the constituents’
share of voting power: in effect, the land assembler would propose
some lump sum, which would then be divided among the neighbors
based on their proportional real estate holdings within the LAD’s area.
The critical facts to emphasize are that (1) the LAD need not accept any proposal (although one would assume that no LAD would be
formed unless the residents had some initial interest in land assembly),
and (2) the LAD could invite other developers aside from the LAD
promoter to submit rival proposals to increase the price offered. In ef-
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fect, the LAD would auction off the neighborhood in hopes that different bids from rival developers would drive up the price. If the LAD
accepted a bid from some developer other than the LAD promoter,
then the winning bidder would have to compensate the LAD promoter
for the administrative costs of going forward with the LAD’s creation.
Otherwise, the LAD would have broad discretion to choose any proposal to redevelop the neighborhood — or reject all such proposals.
Presumably, the LAD would be represented by an attorney in negotiations over the purchase price; this agent would be compensated by the
same sort of contingency fees that eminent domain practitioners typically collect today.78
Because the sale of the neighborhood is a matter of utmost gravity
to the residents, we would require the decision to be approved by a
second vote of the LAD’s constituents, again voting by shares of property. As discussed in more detail below,79 majority approval by each
of several different classes of stakeholders might be required.
3. Dissolution of the LAD. — Not all LADs will succeed. Some
will stall at early stages. Others will not receive the required voting
majority. What happens then? LADs must incorporate procedures for
their dissolution if deadlines for the various steps are not met or if the
vote fails. Otherwise, the neighborhood could be frozen in a nondevelopment limbo, like neighborhoods today that have been designated
as blighted but have not yet been condemned. We would leave the
timelines and details on dissolution to be decided by each state in its
LAD enabling statute. After a LAD dissolves, new LAD proposals
would have to start from scratch, with the drawing of new boundaries
and authorizations.
C. Landowner Exit from LADs
The final aspect of LADs is the right of any individual landowner
to opt out of the proposal even if that proposal is approved by whatever type of majority vote the LAD statute requires. In such a case,
the dissenting landowner would have the right to insist that his or her
parcel be purchased through ordinary eminent domain procedures.
Such a landowner would receive fair market value (FMV) rather than
the sum proposed by the land assembler. Opting out, however, does
not give landowners a new route to delay or derail the LAD’s decision
to sell. Condemnation statutes in many states already allow redevel–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
78 See Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data
and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653, 659 n.12 (2003) (describing the contingency-fee
system for eminent domain cases).
79 See infra pp. 1523–24.
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opment projects to begin even before the validity of the condemnation
has been adjudicated or compensation awarded.
If opting out does not stop the sale, and LAD payments are by
definition above FMV, why would dissenters ever opt out? We expect
that opt-out would be used when an owner believes that the LAD
payment (expressed as FMV * LAD multiplier) is nevertheless below
the “true” FMV. Many properties are hard to value; FMV estimates
can range widely; the LAD may pick an FMV base that is too low.
Nevertheless, we expect there would be few opt-outs because the contingency fee lawyers who litigate condemnation cases get paid only if
they can improve on the LAD’s initial offer. In sum, we include the
opt-out provision to help ensure that in a world with LADs, landowners receive no less than the constitutional measure of just compensation. Opting out is a backstop against potential overreaching and bad
behavior of LAD boards.
IV. HOW LADS PROTECT THE VALUES OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY
Most American landowners will approach LADs with a deep skepticism grounded in an aversion to coerced sale of their homes. Eminent domain, even for uncontroversially “public” uses, such as highways,80 still raises objections because of the forced nature of the
transfer, and the often unseemly political infighting over just whose
neighborhood gets bulldozed.81 Distaste for coerced sale far exceeds
distaste for the social waste that comes from underassembly of land.
Moreover, the premise of the preceding criticism of eminent domain is
that landowners have some sort of entitlement to their real estate that
is superior to the entitlement of taxpayers to their income. Only such
a premise explains why it is more important to ensure that owners receive their subjective valuation of their land than it is to keep taxes
low by paying only fair market value to landowners.
At the same time, the existence of eminent domain attests to a rival
intuition — that democratically approved plans to change land use
patterns within a community should not be held hostage to the stub–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
80 See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF
NEW YORK 850–94 (1974) (describing the decision to run the Cross-Bronx Expressway through
the residential neighborhood of East Tremont). Professor Nicole Garnett observes that neighborhoods that are politically well-organized, such as certain Catholic neighborhoods in Chicago, are
effective at lobbying to reroute freeways to avoid parish churches and parish boundaries. See
Garnett, supra note 27, at 112–15. But Professor Garnett notes that political clout is less likely to
protect neighborhoods that lack the cohesive community and strong organizational system of the
Catholic dioceses in Chicago. See id. at 120–21.
81 See generally Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49 (1998) (describing eminent domain in the context of special interest politics).
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bornness or greed of private property owners. In short, we have competing intuitions about the role of property and democracy in our republic. The test for our LAD proposal is whether it does a better job
of reconciling these values than do the existing institutions of eminent
domain and voluntary purchase.
In this Part, we argue that the proposal outlined above is likely to
pass this test. We evaluate the proposal in light of particular goals:
preservation of the sense of individual autonomy implicit in the right
of private property and preservation of the larger community’s right to
self-government. On these metrics, we argue that LADs are superior
to the status quo. But aside from merely defending LADs, we discuss
the relevant variables with an eye to refining our admittedly sketchy
outline of LADs. Once the values are clarified, we can focus on the
details of the proposed institution and the empirical questions that
need to be resolved to refine these details.
A. Safeguards for Landowners Against Neighborhood Tyranny
Implicit in the concept of private property is the belief that landowners have the right to refuse any offer, even if the price exceeds
their actual valuation of their land. Eminent domain obviously qualifies this absolute dominion over land. As suggested in Part II, this
limit on landowners’ powers can burden condemnees in ways that are
both inefficient and unfair. How do LADs restore some of the landowners’ traditional prerogatives?
Most obviously, the LAD gives landowners a collective veto over
whether to assemble their land into a larger parcel. LADs, therefore,
ensure that the people most affected by an assembly have the power to
determine whether the assembly goes forward. Especially if the rationale for the assembly is improvement of the land being assembled
— say, replacement of aging infrastructure or removal of “blighted”
structures — then the case is strong that the alleged beneficiaries of
the assembly ought to decide for themselves whether they want the
proffered gift.
In response to this claim, one might object that neighborhood control is hardly the same as individual control. The neighborhood might
endorse a proposed land assembly that an individual landowner within
the neighborhood would reject. In such a case, the landowner would
be forced to elect between the compensation offered by the LAD or the
(presumably lesser sum of) fair market value of the landowner’s parcel.
The compensation offered by the LAD would presumably reflect the
median neighbor’s subjective value of his or her land, weighted by the
landowner’s proportional share of the land. Such a figure would be at
least as great as the fair market value of each parcel, but it might be
lower than the subjective valuation that an individual landowner
places on his or her land. After all, the largest landowners might be
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institutions — Real Estate Investment Trusts, corporate landowners,
and so forth — who hold land primarily as an investment and derive
relatively little producer or consumer surplus from the land above the
land’s fair market value. The landowner whose subjective valuation
of his or her parcel exceeded both the fair market value and the
LAD’s best offer would, therefore, be forced to sacrifice the difference
between his or her actual valuation of his or her parcel and the
money provided by the LAD. In effect, LADs substitute neighborhood
control for municipal control. Is there any reason to believe that
neighborhood control protects landowners better?
Yes. We do not minimize the danger that neighborhood control
could become a curse of majoritarian tyranny to the very landowners
that LADs are supposed to benefit. But LADs include safeguards that
contain these dangers within reasonable limits.
To understand the safeguards, it is important to appreciate the
risks against which they guard. Since Madison’s Federalist No. 10, it
has been a bromide of American political theory that, as one shrinks
the size of a jurisdiction, one increases the likelihood that a majority of
the jurisdiction’s residents will share a common interest in oppressing
the minority.82 Smaller jurisdictions tend to have more homogeneous
populations with fewer divisions of interest, making it more difficult
for a minority to use offers of vote-trading to divide a homogeneous
majority. Thus, there is the danger that the majority will enact rules
solely benefiting itself at the expense of a minority for no better reason
than that the majority can hold together a coalition of the selfish. In
the context of land use law, courts have been exceedingly skeptical of
neighborhood control over zoning regulations for precisely this reason:
the courts fear that a majority of neighbors will unite around the goal
of restricting a nearby parcel’s uses and thereby enhance the value of
the neighbors’ own land at the burdened parcel owner’s expense.
Because of this worry about “parochial” and “selfish” behavior,
courts have limited the power of neighborhoods to impose new zoning
restrictions on parcels, relying either on the nondelegation doctrine or
on a theory of procedural due process. Under these theories, neighbors
can be given the power to waive a preexisting restriction on land by
approving a variance, but they cannot impose a new restriction. In
one view, imposition of new restrictions by neighbors violates the
landowners’ right to an impartial decisionmaker, as the neighbors
might be directly interested in the restriction that they are imposing.83
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
82 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within
which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.”).
83 See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122–23 (1928) (holding that the supermajority vote required of neighbors for new construction violated the Due Proc-
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In another view, the local legislature cannot delegate its zoning power
to the neighbors, because this power is essentially legislative in character.84 But the doctrinal niceties that distinguish these two theories are
less important than the practical concern underlying both doctrines —
the concern that the legislature of a larger jurisdiction must supervise
the decisions of the neighbors to prevent them from expropriating
value from parcels in their immediate vicinity.
Should LADs be subject to similar restrictions for the prevention of
majoritarian oppression? Consider three safeguards that mitigate such
dangers — using LADs to create homogeneous interests within the
community, the special voting rules governing LADs, and, finally, the
dissenters’ right to a buyout at fair market value if they are dissatisfied with the LAD’s offer to purchase their land. As we suggest in
more detail below, we think that these safeguards make unlikely the
prospect that LADs will exploit landowners at the behest of their
neighbors.
1. The Homogeneity of Interests Within a LAD. — LADs exist for
a single narrow purpose — to consider whether to sell a neighborhood.
Given this narrow mission, many of the economic cleavages that might
divide a neighborhood into antagonistic factions in the context of zoning or service provision can find no outlet within a LAD. Institutions
with a broader range of functions can more easily redistribute wealth
between members, creating the risk of majoritarian exploitation. For
instance, business improvement districts provide various services —
street cleaning, security, parking facilities, street furniture, signage, and
public relations — to the owners of land within their boundaries.85
But these services can affect landowners in very different ways, based
on the landowner’s current use of his or her land. For example, merchants may want to increase the number of parking spaces for customers, while residential owners might want to cut down on traffic. These
differences in self-interest make for contentious neighborhood politics
and result in poor governance. Even apparently homogeneous groups
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ess Clause); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143–45 (1912) (striking an ordinance allowing a two-thirds vote of neighbors to draw a building line because the ordinance “enables the
convenience or purpose of one set of property owners to control the property right of others”).
84 See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. 1997)
(holding that assessments of cost for boll weevil eradication on plaintiff’s land, per delegation of
state statute, was unconstitutional under Texas’s nondelegation doctrine); Asmara Tekle Johnson,
Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very Public Power to Private, Non-Profit and
Charitable Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 455, 460–67 (2007) (describing the private nondelegation doctrine generally and in the context of eminent domain).
85 See, e.g., Lisa Chamberlain, Cleveland Pulls Back from the Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2005, at C9 (noting Cleveland’s creation of a BID for “cleanup and beautification” purposes);
Terry Pristin, For Improvement Districts, Restored Alliance with City, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
18, 2002, at B1 (describing the functions of BIDs and their relationship with New York City’s
government).
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can find grounds for disagreement when the jurisdiction that they are
attempting to govern provides services that affect each individual in a
unique way: the condo owners near the top of a building will care
more about elevator maintenance than the owners on the ground floor,
and so forth. In short, even trivial differences in current land use can
create political conflict in jurisdictions that provide services to their
members.
By contrast, LADs simplify the interests of their constituents by
addressing only one issue — the net price that those constituents receive from the sale of their neighborhood. All differences of interest
based on the constituents’ different activities or investments, therefore,
merge into a single question: is the price offered by the assembler sufficient to induce the constituents to sell?
To minimize the danger that even this simple decision will result in
governance-impeding redistributive politics, LAD-enabling legislation
ought to remove the question of how the neighborhood’s total price is
divided up among the neighbors. State law should require that the
proceeds be distributed according to each landowner’s share of property within the LAD. These shares could be measured by percentage
of total square footage, percentage of total valuation, or any other easily ascertainable measure. The important point is that no owner could
increase his or her share of the total purchase price by organizing a
coalition to expropriate from noncoalition members. The shares would
be written in statutory stone, and the constituents of the LAD could
vote only on whether to accept the total price for their neighborhood.
In this way, the self-interest of each landowner would be linked to the
collective goal of getting the highest total price for the neighborhood.
This is not to say that the LAD’s politics would be devoid of selfinterested conflicts. There would still be the possibility that some constituents of the LAD would be more willing to sell than others, because
they would place less value on the particular use of their land. Landowners who held their parcels purely as a form of passive investment
— say, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) — would derive little
surplus value from their land above its market value. They might sell
as soon as their percentage of the neighborhood’s assembly value exceeded the market value of their lots.86 By contrast, landowners who
derived some sort of producer or consumer surplus from their parcels
above market value might be reluctant to agree to an offer that would
tempt a REIT. The dry cleaner, for instance, who has invested time
and money in cultivating the good will of local customers could not
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
86 This account of REITs’ incentives ignores the tax consequences for REITs of capital gains,
a matter that would need to be addressed at the federal level as states begin enabling local governments to experiment with LADs.
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easily transfer this investment to another site. Such owners would be
reluctant to sell at a price that might tempt the passive investor, because their investment in good will would be lost if they relocated their
businesses.
In short, there would remain a danger that owners who valued
their parcels above their market value would be exploited by investors
who valued the parcels at a lower amount. But how great is the risk
of exploitation? It is important to note that the potential victims of the
LAD form a large and heterogeneous group, including homeowners (or
condo owners) who value proximity to their workplace and friends;
professionals who value the prestige of a particular address; retailers
who value proximity to particular customers; and manufacturers who
value proximity to suppliers. Opposed to these owners are investors
who place no special value on their parcels above their market value
— REITs and others. What is the realistic likelihood that such investors would dominate a particular neighborhood? Owners who buy
land as an investment typically diversify their holdings as a hedge
against risk: it would be odd for a REIT to buy out an entire city
block rather than invest in a particular office building. Thus, one
would not expect investment-oriented owners to control a single LAD.
Of course, the LAD itself might encourage an investor to acquire a
majority interest within a single neighborhood, anticipating that the
LAD will facilitate its resale to a land assembler. To prevent any
neighborhood from being dominated by a single landowner with a
homogeneous interest, one could use a variety of devices akin to rules
for discouraging “greenmail” in corporate law.87 One could, for instance, bar any landowner from voting more than 30% of the property
within a LAD.88 One could also force landowners intent on controlling a majority interest of a LAD to disclose their intention before they
acquire a majority interest in the LAD’s shares. We discuss these options in more detail when we consider LADs in light of analogous legal
institutions — in particular, legal rules regulating shareholder
“freezeouts” by a controlling shareholder.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
87 See generally David Manry & David Stangeland, Greenmail: A Brief History, 6 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 217, 224–30 (2001) (defining “greenmail” and describing legislation designed to regulate it).
88 By analogy, state law sometimes limits the power of a single landowner to acquire a majority of the votes within a BID by requiring that the BID be approved by a majority of property
owners as well as by the owners of a majority of property within the BID. See, e.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 40O, § 3 (West 2004) (approval of BID requires approval by owners of 51% of
assessed valuation and 60% of owners); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-63-6 (Michie 1995) (petition for
creation of BID can be submitted to council by majority of owners of either business or general
real property within the proposed district); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-84-511 (2005) (BID petition
must be “signed by not less than a majority in number of the owners of real property in the district” who also own two-thirds of assessed valuation).
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In sum, the risk that a LAD will ignore the interests of any subset
of owners seems remote. To be sure, it is conceivable that owners with
only transient interests in a neighborhood will gang up on owners with
deep connections to their parcels. But balanced against this risk is the
rival danger that city officials, elected by voters with no interest whatsoever in a neighborhood’s real estate, will authorize eminent domain
in utter indifference to whether the residents’ valuation of their current use exceeds the value of the proposed assembly. The track record
of eminent domain suggests that landowners have more to fear from
city hall than from their own neighbors.
2. Voting Rights Within LADs. — The critical factor for determining the relative power of landowners within a LAD would be the
LAD’s voting rules. LADs require neighbors to vote on two different
issues: the initial establishment of the LAD and the ratification of the
LAD’s proposal to sell the neighborhood to an assembler. How should
voting rights be allocated concerning these two decisions?
There is an intuitively plausible, albeit constitutionally controversial, argument in favor of allocating votes according to each neighbor’s
share of property holdings within the LAD. The LAD has only one
purpose — to overcome the landowners’ collective action problems
that prevent them from selling their land for an efficient assembly. As
noted above, to focus the landowners exclusively on the task of maximizing the total purchase price for the neighborhood, each owner’s
share of that price would be statutorily determined by the landowner’s
share of the property within the LAD. The same goal suggests allocating voting rights in proportion to the owner’s share of land. The alternative rule of giving each resident within a LAD an equal share of
votes would encourage speculators to make a minimal investment in
areas ripe for assembly in hopes of forcing a profitable sale. Such opportunistic investments are likely to be small and transient — say,
short-term leases — and would not reflect the special value that owners with more permanent attachments place on the location of their
parcels. Equal voting rights, therefore, would seem to invite the exploitation of owners with high subjective value of their parcels by
residents who value their property interest at no more than the interest’s resale value. Given that the LAD’s narrow agenda is focused exclusively on maximizing the sale price of a neighborhood, it would
seem odd to give residents power over LADs that is unrelated to their
stake in that sale price. Therefore, one might model LADs after business improvement districts and allocate voting power according to the
property owner’s share of property within the district.
Would the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment permit such
a property-based system of voting rights? The doctrine is murky on
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the issue. The Court’s “one person, one vote” doctrine bars states from
limiting the franchise to property owners even when such owners
would seem to have the predominant interest in a decision.89 However, the Court has drawn an exception for special districts that are authorized to pursue only narrowly defined goals disproportionately affecting property owners.90 Thus, the plurality in Ball v. James91
permitted Arizona to allocate votes for control over an agricultural
improvement district based on each landowner’s share of acreage
within the district, on the theory that the district had the narrow task
of distributing water stored behind its dams to property owners in
proportion to their share of the district’s acreage.92 The critical fact in
Ball was the narrow function performed by the special district — the
management of a water supply that had already been allocated according to acreage.93 The analogy to LADs is easy to draw: landowners’
shares of the proceeds from the LAD’s sale of a neighborhood would
be allocated according to each landowner’s share of real estate within
the district. Given that the power of LADs would be narrowly drawn
to avoid redistribution of wealth, it would be odd to allocate voting
power in a way that would facilitate such prohibited redistribution.
One might object that LADs would dramatically affect the interests
of lessees in ways that are disproportionate to their common-law entitlement to property. The tenant who has resided in the same apartment for many years may have built up friendships and networks of
support that are not reflected in the value of her year-to-year lease.
Land assembly may eliminate the apartment building and dispossess
the tenant of her neighborhood. Why should the lessee be denied an
equal vote in a decision so fundamentally affecting her interest? But
there is an obvious rejoinder to this objection: if the individual landlord can dispossess the tenant by refusing to renew the lease, then it is
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89 See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (requiring districts for electing board of
junior college to be drawn to achieve equal population); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding denial of the vote in a school district election to a resident neither
owning or leasing taxable real property nor having children attending the public school unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (holding that local election districts must be drawn according to the equipopulation principle).
90 See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (upholding an Arizona water district electoral scheme
enfranchising only property owners to vote); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding California water storage district’s apportionment of votes
according to the amount of property owned in district).
91 451 U.S. 355.
92 Id. at 370 (“The functions of the Salt River District are therefore of the narrow, special sort
which justifies a departure from the popular-election requirement of the Reynolds[ v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964)] case.”).
93 Id. at 367–68 (“The constitutionally relevant fact is that all water delivered by the Salt
River District . . . is distributed according to land ownership, and the District does not and cannot
control the use to which the landowners who are entitled to the water choose to put it.” (footnote
omitted)).
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not obvious why a group of landlords should not have an equal power
to terminate tenants’ interests through collective land assembly. If
condo conversions do not violate the tenants’ rights of democratic
equality, then why should one balk at conversion of a neighborhood
through the device of a LAD?
The Court’s voting rights jurisprudence provides no certain answer
to this question. The most one can say is that, under Ball, if procedures for collective decisionmaking are closely connected to the management of private property, then voting rights can be allocated on the
basis of those private property interests. Lower court decisions upholding such allocations of voting rights for business improvement districts suggest that voting rights in LADs could be allocated according
to the owners’ share of property.94 But it would be tendentious to assert that the case law provides any clear answer to the constitutional
question.
The constitutional difficulty of assigning unequal voting rights
based on persons’ interests in real estate need not disenfranchise tenants. Leaseholds, after all, are a form of property, just as are fees simple absolute. Therefore, LADs could assign voting rights to lessees
based on the terms and value of the leases. A critical issue would be
the alienability of such voting rights. In eminent domain, the lessee’s
right to compensation can be assigned to the landlord by the express
terms of the lease. Allowing the parties to assign the compensation
right ex ante in this manner has been defended as a way to reduce the
cost and unpredictability of litigation.95 There is no good a priori reason, however, why the right to vote ought to be assignable in this
manner; many rights are not alienable, such as the rights created by
laws that control or stabilize rents.96 Likewise, tenants have statutory
rights to relocation expenses in eminent domain that they cannot

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
94 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding a
class voting system based on property-owning status for election of managers to a BID’s board
because the BID did not “exercise the core powers of sovereignty typical of a general purpose
governmental body” and “both the burdens and the benefits of [the BID’s] activities disproportionately impact[ed] property owners”).
95 See Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing and
Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1083,
1106–25 (1987).
96 See Victoria A. Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting Tenants from Condominium Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 179, 210 (1983).
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waive by lease.97 One might analogize the right to vote in a LAD to
other inalienable rights like the right to vote more generally.98
We are agnostic about the merits of making such interests inalienable, noting only that the issue has been thoroughly canvassed in the
literature.99 To the extent that the tenants’ interests are inalienable,
then the terms of the lease would not dictate the assignment of voting
rights based on those property interests. Moreover, even if one deemed
the right to vote one’s LAD shares to be assignable to the landlord,
courts might still construe ambiguous leases to favor the tenant’s retention of the right to vote.100 Most important, in appraising the value
of the tenants’ property rights on which voting rights would be based,
the LAD statute should take into account not only the dollar amount
of rent payable under the lease, but also the actual market value of the
property interest. Thus, rent-controlled units would be worth far more
than the rent owed under the terms of the lease. Likewise, the LAD
statute would supplement the value of the leasehold with the value of
the tenants’ statutory rights to relocation assistance, for such rights are
a very considerable part of the value to which the tenant is entitled
upon condemnation of a leasehold.101 The general principle defining
the tenants’ share of the vote would be that the tenant is entitled to
“vote the value” of whatever the tenant would be entitled to receive
were the land actually condemned. Only such voting rights can provide the tenant with protection from displacement analogous to the
protections available under the old regime of eminent domain.102
Such a rule would, in some cases, give tenants a substantial voice
in LADs’ decisionmaking: commercial tenants with long-term leases
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
97 The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4601–4655 (2000), obliges all agencies that condemn land with federal funds to provide
advisory assistance, id. § 4625, and financial benefits, id. § 4622, to tenants displaced by eminent
domain.
98 For a defense of the position that the right to vote ought to be alienable in some circumstances, see Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 111 (2000).
99 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986);
William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991).
100 Cf. Pennsylvania Ave. Dev. Corp. v. One Parcel of Land, 670 F.2d 289, 294–95 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (awarding just compensation to lessee because condemnation clause was ambiguous).
101 For an assessment of the value of such relocation rights relative to the value of the lease, see
Joseph J. Cordes, Compensation Through Relocation Assistance, 55 LAND ECON. 486 (1979).
The inclusion of the relocation rights as a basis for defining the tenants’ voting rights assumes, of
course, that the tenant would not be entitled to such relocation assistance if the LAD voted to sell
the neighborhood and the tenant accepted her share of the LAD’s sale price. If the tenant intended to exercise her opt-out option, then she would be entitled to the normal recovery in eminent domain — including the normal relocation assistance.
102 Admittedly, the proposal that the votes associated with a parcel be divided between landlord and tenant raises difficult valuation questions, as there is often not a thick market in leases
by which the lease’s value can be measured. One might instead measure the value of a lease by
the present value of rental payments due under the term of the lease.
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might, indeed, have estates worth more than their lessor’s fee simple
absolute. The voting power of short-term residential lessees, by contrast, would be relatively tiny and largely symbolic: even when aggregated, the value of such leases would rarely constitute a substantial
share of a parcel’s value.
Would such a rule leave short-term tenants worse off than the current regime of eminent domain? Under eminent domain, the shortterm tenant would likely be entitled to no compensation whatsoever:
under the prevailing doctrine, the condemnation of leased property
terminates lease obligations, and this elimination of the tenants’ obligation to pay rent normally constitutes just compensation for the loss
of a short-term lease.103 LADs, by contrast, give all tenants great and
small some voice in the decision to assemble land. When opposed by
the landowners, to be sure, this voice would not count for much, at
least for short-term leases. But when landowners were closely divided,
tenants could potentially cast a decisive vote.
This compromise on voting rights best reconciles the values of democratic equality and private property implicit in a LAD. In order to
succeed, LADs must not become vehicles for the redistribution of
wealth. Any such redistributive mission will create paralyzing clashes
between heterogeneous interests. As the history of other institutions
suggests, owners with heterogeneous interests are not successful managers of enterprises.104 To avoid such conflict, therefore, the rules for
voting should mirror the rules for dividing up the asset price that
LADs receive in exchange for the sale of their property. Lessees
should be entitled to a share of both votes and dollars in proportion to
the value of their leases. But they cannot receive more without defeating the whole point of LADs. Indeed, we strongly suspect that landowners would successfully lobby to defeat LAD enabling legislation if
voting rights were allocated equally among interest holders.
B. Safeguards for Community Against Holdout Neighborhoods:
Defining Uniqueness
A neighborhood might not only exercise unjust power over an individual landowner. One neighborhood’s stubborn refusal to sell its land
could threaten the welfare of the whole municipality, region, county,
and so forth, whenever the land controlled by the neighborhood is necessary for some project with regional benefits. One would not worry
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
103 See Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 304 (1976) (“The measure of damages is the value of the use and occupancy of the leasehold for the remainder of the tenant’s term,
plus the value of the right to renew . . . , less the agreed rent which the tenant would pay for such
use and occupancy.” (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S.
372, 381 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
104 See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996).
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about this threat when there are multiple possible sites for some regionally beneficial project. The real difficulty with “holdout neighborhoods” arises when a neighborhood sits astride some unique site for
which there is no practical substitute — say, the only site on which a
port, highway, or airport can be built.
Our proposal requires government to use LADs in place of eminent
domain only when the property sought is not unique. But when is a
site sufficiently unique that eminent domain would be permitted? The
answer is ambiguous because parcels of land are never perfectly fungible substitutes for one another. To answer this question, therefore, one
must offer a definition of uniqueness that does not make the normal
nonfungibility of land an excuse for condemnation. Purchasers normally cannot find a perfect substitute for a land purchase. It would be
odd, however, to use the normal condition of land markets as a reason
to bypass market exchange in favor of a forced sale.
To provide a more specific definition of “uniqueness” that would
justify eminent domain rather than a LAD, we consider two different
circumstances in which the owner of a parcel might be said to have a
unique resource. First, there is the case of unusually substandard —
“blighted” — land. Second, there is the case of unusually valuable
land.
1. Condemnation of Blighted Land. — Sometimes a site is unique
not because it is especially valuable but because it is especially
blighted. Neighborhoods with a higher-than-average percentage of
rundown or abandoned buildings and vacant lots are likely to generate
crime and depress nearby property values. Nearby landowners afflicted with such a blighted neighborhood cannot seek relief from such
an eyesore from anyone except the owners of the blighted land. In this
sense, blighted land gives its owners monopoly power.105 Even if those
owners were organized into a LAD, one might reasonably believe that
there is a distributive injustice in allowing such owners to extort revenue from the local government as the price for discontinuing their noisome effects on the rest of the city. Likewise, voluntary bargains between a LAD composed of the owners of blighted land and the city
might fail as a result of the dickering arising from bilateral monopoly.
For these reasons, eminent domain rather than LADs might be the
best way to address blight.
The difficulty with this justification for eminent domain is that the
statutory definitions for “blight” tend to require far less than the sort of
extraordinary decay that undermines LADs. Often state statutes list
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
105 See Fennell, supra note 15, at 975 (explaining that owners of blighted land exercise
“monopoly power on the resource that must be acquired in order for the government’s goal to be
accomplished”).
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several different criteria for defining blight and allow condemnation of
any neighborhood characterized by any one of those criteria.106 The
predictable result is that neighborhoods are condemned as “blighted”
even when their quality is not noticeably lower than the quality of an
average city block.107 Neither distributive justice nor barriers to bargaining would seem to require eminent domain in such a case. The
owners of average-quality land impose no higher cost on the rest of the
community than the rest of the community imposes on them. Moreover, the average-quality neighborhood lacks any monopoly power, for
there are — by definition — many other neighborhoods with precisely
the same “power” to impose their mediocrity on the rest of the community. A local government that wishes to upgrade one such
neighborhood could organize several such mediocre neighborhoods
into competing LADs, offering a mix of financing — tax abatements,
tax increment financing, outright grants, and the like — to the
neighborhood that agrees to assemble its land at the lowest cost. Since
all such neighborhoods would be equally “blighted,” none would have
any special power to hold out for a sum in excess of its true opportunity costs of vacating the property. There is, in short, no reason to
forgo LADs to address “blight” when the blight in question is simply
mediocrity.
Therefore, to constrain the use of eminent domain, one might require that local governments use LADs rather than eminent domain to
remedy “blight” whenever the jurisdiction defines blight to include
neighborhoods of average quality. That a neighborhood, like most urban neighborhoods, has room for improvement is no reason to impose
the extraordinary burden of eminent domain on its residents. Instead,
the city can induce the neighborhood to improve itself by holding an
auction in which different neighborhoods compete for scarce city resources. In this way, the city can assemble those neighborhoods in
which the residents are least attached to the current use of their land.
2. Condemnation of Uniquely Valuable Land. — What about especially high-quality land — land that has the quality of being, in some
sense, uniquely suited to the government’s purposes? We urge that
LADs be required whenever the assembler can make a credible threat
to develop an alternative site. The alternative site need not be a per–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
106 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 24-2-2(c), 24-3-2 (2007); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031
(West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-20, 40:55C-3 (West 2003) (latter section repealed 1992).
See generally Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law,
35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 389, 394–404 (2000) (providing an overview of state definitions
and criteria for “blight”).
107 See Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 197–98 (2007) (describing how broad pre-Kelo definitions of “blight”
in state legislation failed to limit the use of eminent domain).
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fect substitute for the proposed parcel: it need only be comparable
enough to constrain the sellers from demanding rents in excess of their
opportunity costs. Since the buyer is likely to be far better informed
about the requirements of the assembled parcel, the buyer will be able
to make a credible threat whenever the seller could reasonably believe
that the buyer could develop elsewhere. This is the normal protection
for buyers of land; there is no obvious reason why governments need
greater protection from the power of sellers to decline the buyers’ bids.
The example of Detroit’s condemnation of Poletown illustrates the
circumstance in which LADs would be a feasible substitute for eminent domain. The Poletown site for General Motors Corporation’s Detroit Assembly Plant was chosen over nine other potential sites considered by a joint committee of city officials and General Motors
representatives. Although other sites were feasible locations for an assembly plant, they did not meet all of GMC’s exacting demands for
size, shape, rail access, proximity to existing plants, and quick availability. Because GMC refused to compromise on any of its criteria, the
Poletown site was selected even though that choice threatened more
businesses and homes with destruction than several other sites.108
There is no doubt, however, that several of the nine other sites presented credible alternatives to Poletown. GMC could not maximize all
of its criteria simultaneously. Given the complexity of the criteria, it
would be impossible for any of the proposed sites to believe that theirs
was GMC’s ideal site. Had each proposed site been formed into a
LAD, then the City of Detroit could have held an auction in which
each LAD competed to sell its land to GMC. The competition for sites
would resemble the normal bidding process by which contractors
compete to sell goods to cities.
The advantage of such a process is that it would reveal information
about how attached residents were to the current use of their
neighborhood: the higher the price demanded by a LAD, the more
likely it would be that the neighbors placed a high value on their current use. Of course, municipal planners attempt to estimate the degree
to which current residents value their neighborhood by examining the
number of residents and businesses that would be displaced by eminent domain. It is common for assemblers of land to argue that a proposed assembly will minimize disruption of residents and businesses
because the land to be assembled is underpopulated.109 But this
method of assessing the value of the current use focuses on residential
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
108 See BRYAN D. JONES & LYNN W. BACHELOR WITH CARTER WILSON, THE SUSTAINING HAND: COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP AND CORPORATE POWER 74–76 (1986).
109 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro, Baltimore Makes a Bold Bid To Transform Neighborhood,

WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2003, at A1 (describing a biotechnology development plan in a hollowed-out
neighborhood).
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density and ignores residents’ intensity of preferences. Intensity is at
least as important as density; for instance, the condemnation of a hotel
with short-term residents would surely be less disruptive than the condemnation of a neighborhood with only a few homeowners who had
lived in the vicinity for a long time. An auction among competing
LADs provides a measure of intensity that such cursory surveys of
density lack by forcing each resident to put his money where his
mouth is — that is, to choose between the status quo and the assembler’s check.
Such a mechanism is valuable not only to residents, but also to the
assembler. It is not uncommon for city officials to complain that residents demand excessive amounts of money to mitigate the costs of
land assembly.110 The rival bids of LADs place a ceiling on such demands. So long as those bids are credible to the seller-LADs, they ensure that the auction among LADs will function just as well as an ordinary land market — that is, good enough for government work.
Against the danger of sellers’ monopolistic power, one must also
consider the power of the land assembler backed by the government.
The assembler might have exclusive access to the mix of financing devices sufficient to purchase an entire neighborhood. GMC, for instance, effectively dictated the terms of the Poletown sale, because
GMC was the only investor interested in purchasing several hundred
acres of land in Detroit.111 Likewise, the city itself will frequently be
the only feasible bidder on large-scale assemblies, because only the city
will have control over the tax abatements, tax-increment financing,
density bonuses, and federal grants by which such parcels are typically
purchased. In short, assemblers are just as likely to be monopsonists
as neighborhoods are to be monopolists. Such an assembler will frequently be able to make a credible threat to invest its resources in a
more tractable neighborhood if a LAD demands an excessive price.
For this reason, we suspect that the problem of LADs’ monopoly
power will rarely arise.
V. PUTTING LADS IN CONTEXT:
INSTITUTIONAL ANALOGIES TO LADS
The foregoing sketch is, well, sketchy. Because no jurisdiction has
ever authorized the creation of LADs, we have no data on how they
are likely to perform. Our speculation is that they could not do much
worse than eminent domain. But this intuition rests on confidence in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
110 See LYNNE B. SAGALYN, TIMES SQUARE ROULETTE: REMAKING THE CITY ICON 100
(2001) (describing Mayor Ed Koch’s outrage that “[w]e had to buy [the] Clinton [neighborhood]
twice” to appease objections to the 42nd Street development project).
111 See JONES & BACHELOR WITH WILSON, supra note 108, at 69–74.
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bargaining over centralized and expert planning. Perhaps this confidence is misplaced.
Absent an actual LAD track record, the best way to assess how
LADs are likely to perform is to assess the performance of closely
analogous institutions. In this Part, we compare LADs to a variety of
different institutions that bear some resemblance to LADs — land readjustment districts, joint-stock corporations, business improvement
districts, oil and gas unitization districts, and class actions. The point
of these comparisons is to consider how well LADs are likely to deal
with common pitfalls of collective decisionmaking and bargaining. As
we argue below, there is no a priori reason to believe that LADs would
systematically underperform these veteran mechanisms of collective
decisionmaking. Of course, a priori reasoning is no substitute for actual experience. However, we think that the initial indicators are good
enough for some political entrepreneur in our federal system to give
LADs a try.
A. Three Characteristics of Institutions:
Duration, Intensity, Composition
As a guide for assessing LADs, we consider three characteristics
relevant to an institution’s capacity for collective self-governance: duration, intensity, and composition.
The first characteristic concerns the duration of the issues governed
by the institution. Some institutions govern a group for an indefinite
period of time. For instance, a condo association governs its residents
during the duration of their tenure. We call these institutions the
“long-term commons.” Other institutions govern a single transaction,
after which the association between the members dissolves. For instance, a class action lawsuit exists only for the purpose of resolving a
dispute between the class and the defendants, after which the class
dissolves. We call these institutions “the one-shot deal.” The LAD,
like the class action, is a one-shot deal: once the neighborhood is sold,
the neighbors go their separate ways.
The second characteristic is the intensity of the members’ stake in
the institution. Some institutions play for small stakes: business improvement districts, for instance, typically have tiny budgets and govern relatively small matters such as street furniture or extra cleanup of
streets.112 Likewise, the plaintiffs in a class action might each have
small damages at stake in the litigation, even if the aggregate loss is

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
112 See Briffault, supra note 12, at 369–70 (describing BIDs as “low-cost tool[s]” responsible for
“traditional municipal activities”).
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large.113 Residential community associations (RCAs) and condo associations control issues such as assessments, the maintenance of common areas of the subdivision or building, and external design such as
house color and fencing.114 These are not trivial matters, but they are
hardly the stuff of high politics. Unsurprisingly, turnout in RCA elections tends to be extremely low. By contrast, LADs govern possession
of one’s home or business, assets that are usually the owner’s most important investment.
Intensity of one’s stake depends in large part on whether one can
insure oneself against a decision that is adverse to one’s interests. A
shareholder who has taken a controlling position in a single corporation has a highly intense stake in the performance of that corporation
because his investment is not diversified. As Professor William Fischel
has noted, homeowners likewise tend to have an intense stake in decisions affecting the value of their home, because their assets are concentrated in that one investment.115 By contrast, a shareholder with a set
of small investments in a diversified portfolio might rationally ignore
the glossy corporate literature that arrives in her mailbox, trusting in
an efficient market rather than shareholder democracy to protect her
position.
The third characteristic is the composition of the institution’s
members. Different institutions’ activities affect their members’ interests in different ways. Business improvement districts, for instance,
govern retailers who seek to attract customers, residents who hate extra traffic, and manufacturers who gain little from street cleaning.
Likewise, even if bargaining units are carefully policed to ensure some
minimum community of interest, the members of a trade union will often have conflicting interests based on job description, seniority, or
skill level. We call these institutions “heterogeneous” organizations.
By contrast, members’ interests in other organizations can be relatively
identical. For instance, the members of LADs are uniformly interested
in a high purchase price, given that their shares of the price would
(under our proposal) be fixed by statute.116 The owners of an oil or
gas unitization district have interests in the management of a single as-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
113 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not economically
feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits
for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the
class-action device. . . . Its benefits to class members are often nominal and symbolic, with persons
other than class members becoming the chief beneficiaries.”).
114 See ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 20–25 (1992).
115 See FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 4.
116 See supra Part IV.A.1.
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set — gas or oil — the production of which they jointly wish to maximize.117 We call these institutions “homogeneous” organizations.
TABLE 2. THREE DIMENSIONS OF GROUP PROPERTY
Owners’ Interests
Heterogeneous
Homogeneous
Big
Small
Big
Small
stakes
stakes
stakes
stakes
Repeat
Dealings
Type of
Interaction
OneShot
Deals

BIDs,
street
closing,
traffic
calming
Class
members
in a class
action

Trade
unions,
workerowned
businesses
Ordinary
eminent
domain

Residential
community
association

Land
adjustment,
oil & gas
unitization

Small
corporate
shareholder

LADs,
controlling
shareholder

These three characteristics — duration, intensity, and composition
— are importantly related to institutional performance. Since Professor Henry Hansmann published The Ownership of Enterprise, it has
become a familiar point that institutions controlled by persons with
heterogeneous interests in that institution tend to be difficult to govern.118 Likewise, the literature on the governance of limited access
commons resources suggests that commoners may be able to police opportunistic behavior more readily if they have repeated dealings with
each other.119 Finally, members with low stakes in an institution
might confront collective action problems in monitoring the institution’s performance. Because each member’s individual interest in the
outcome might be less than the cost of her participating in every decision (for example, attending boring meetings in the evening, hiring a
babysitter, and reading dull technical literature), each member will be
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
117

Gary D. Libecap, Unitization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
LAW 641 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also Charles Lockwood, In the Los Angeles Oil
Boom, Derricks Sprouted Like Trees, SMITHSONIAN, Oct. 1980, at 187 (describing the scene
when bargaining fails).
118 See HANSMANN, supra note 104, at 39–43.
119 The classic game-theoretical account of how repeated play leads to cooperation is ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12–14 (1984). For a communitarian account
of the same tendency, see MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 65–90
(1982).
AND THE
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tempted to free ride off of the efforts of her fellow members in policing
the institutions’ agents.120
Given the centrality of these characteristics, one might compare
LADs to other institutions to see how LADs measure up in terms of
their composition, intensity, and duration. LADs tend to affect their
members in fairly homogeneous ways, boding well for their power to
avoid intra-LAD conflict. But LADs also provide a one-shot deal concerning an intensely valued asset — the home or business. Can the
LAD’s members be trusted not to be opportunistic?
B. An Alphabet of Acronyms: Some Institutional Analogies to LADs
As the analogies below indicate, LADs differ from many other
mechanisms of collective self-governance in that they provide a oneshot deal: the community dissolves once the neighborhood is sold. By
contrast, the members of a business improvement district, land adjustment district, condo association, or joint-stock corporation must
continue to work together indefinitely over the course of many different transactions.
According to the conventional wisdom, the one-shot deal is a recipe
for institutional failure. Members know that, after the transaction,
they will never have to deal with each other again — knowledge that,
one might suspect, would encourage opportunism. Yet we argue that
the lack of continuing relations among neighbors after the LAD sells
the neighborhood actually advances cooperation. The greater power
to eliminate entirely the neighbors’ possession and control increases
the homogeneity of the neighbors’ interests. This homogeneity, in
turn, reduces the danger of welfare-reducing factions and conflicts. In
this way, LADs may prove to be more successful than analogous forms
of collective governance. At the same time, the one-shot deal poses
problems akin to those raised by corporate freezeouts whenever LAD
members have nonhomogeneous interests. These considerations do not
guarantee LADs’ success, but do suggest that LADs are worth a try.
1. LADs and Land Readjustment. — The closest analogy to LADs,
one which gives us substantial confidence in their potential, comes
from the land pooling and readjustment procedures developed in
Germany in the late nineteenth century and used today most often in
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Australia. About thirty percent of Japan’s

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
120 In public law, the classic account of the problem is ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260–76 (1957). In private law, the problem arises in the form of the
agency costs of insuring that officers of a corporation faithfully represent the interests of rationally
ignorant shareholders.
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urban land has been developed using these techniques, through over
11,000 land readjustment projects.121
The essence of land readjustment is that the owners of the area to
be “readjusted” consolidate their land into a common pool, which is
then redivided into smaller lots to provide infrastructure — roads,
sewers, parks, and so forth — that will raise the value of the property.
The owners receive in return some share of the consolidated land, usually but not necessarily in the form of a smaller but better serviced and
therefore more valuable parcel. Alternatively, the owners could receive stock in the development created from the readjusted land. For
instance, the reconstruction of war-torn Beirut during the 1990s, after
the Lebanese civil war, was financed in part by downtown property
owners’ contributions of 1650 parcels of real property.122 In return,
these landowners received shares in Solidere, the development company rebuilding Beirut’s central district. In Taiwan and Japan, private landowners can initiate the process of readjustment, but only if
large majorities of the landowners consent.123 In Germany, the government initiates land readjustment without the consent of the affected
landowners.124
Readjustment resembles LADs in one key respect: both give the existing landowners some share of the gains from assembling land. This
stake in the assembly ensures that the landowners will have an incentive to promote rather than obstruct the assembly — a key benefit,
given the power of landowners to throw a wrench in the assembly
process.125
But readjustment differs from LADs in at least three important respects. First, readjustment is not primarily a mechanism for giving
landowners the power to bargain over whether or not to sell their
neighborhood. Instead, readjustment assumes that the neighborhood
ought to be readjusted and simply gives the landowners some share of
the assembly gains. In some jurisdictions, such as Germany, landowners simply have no say in whether readjustment goes forward. In Japan, landowners can veto a readjustment, but there is no mechanism
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
121 André Sorensen, Consensus, Persuasion, and Opposition: Organizing Land Readjustment in
Japan, in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT 89, 89 (Yu-Hung Hong & Barrie Needham eds.,
2007); see also WORLD BANK, HOUSING: ENABLING MARKETS TO WORK 132 (1993).
122 Lynne B. Sagalyn, Land Assembly, Land Readjustment, and Public-Private Redevelopment,
in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT, supra note 121, at 159, 172–73.
123 Yu-Hung Hong, Assembling Land for Urban Development: Issues and Opportunities, in
ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT, supra note 121, at 3, 19.
124 See generally Benjamin Davy, Mandatory Happiness? Land Readjustment and Property in
Germany, in ANALYZING LAND READJUSTMENT, supra note 121, at 37.
125 For proposals on how to bring land readjustment to America, see generally George W.
Liebmann, Land Readjustment for America: A Proposal for a Statute, 32 URB. LAW. 1 (2000); Sagalyn, supra note 122; Michael M. Shultz & Frank Schnidman, The Potential Application of Land
Readjustment in the United States, 22 URB. LAW. 197 (1990).
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by which landowners can bargain with an assembler over the purchase
price.126 Thus, readjustment is not really an allocative mechanism for
determining whether land ought to be assembled. Instead, readjustment is simply a distributive mechanism for giving landowners a share
of the assembly gains.127
Second, readjustment does not permit the wholesale transformation
of the neighborhood. Instead, readjustment simply “readjusts” the
boundaries of the lots, requiring each landowner to contribute a certain percentage of land in exchange for better infrastructure. The
landowner’s share of the total cost of the project may depend on the
nature of the “readjusted” lot that he receives in return: owners who
receive lots on especially wide streets or favorable corners might be
called upon to contribute a larger share to the cost of infrastructure.128
Thus, readjustment is not a useful mechanism for transforming a residential neighborhood to a completely different use such as an auto factory or festival mall.
Third, readjustment forces the neighbors to bear some of the risk of
the assembly by giving them shares of the project rather than cash.
The residents do not sell their neighborhood; instead, they trade their
individual lots for shares in a new, improved neighborhood of uncertain value. Assuming that the neighbors are not experienced real estate developers, they might be averse to bearing this sort of risk. In
any case, they might be incapable of determining whether their share
in the final project will be worth their contributions of land. Unlike a
simple percentage of a total purchase price, a share in a consolidated
project is a lumpy asset, difficult for an amateur to evaluate.
These three differences between LADs and readjustment are rooted
in one critical fact about the latter: readjustment forces the neighbors
to be long-term partners in land assembly. Far from being a one-shot
deal, readjustment creates a long-term commons in which the existing
landowners contribute the capital, bear the risk, and retain a possessory interest in land assembly. Absent a neighborhood composed entirely of real estate experts, this cumbersome arrangement will frequently be impractical as a method of financing urban redevelopment.
2. LADs and CDCs. — The Community Development Corporation
(CDC) can bear a family resemblance to the LAD, especially if the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
126
127

See Sorensen, supra note 121, at 107–09.
As noted above, Professors Lehavi and Licht’s proposal to give neighbors a share in a special-purpose development corporation is roughly analogous to land readjustment and suffers from
this same failing: the proposal does not give the condemnees any veto over land assemblies that
have a value lower than the neighborhood that the assembly would destroy. See supra Part
II.C.1.
128 This method of dividing up contributions is used in South Korea. See Ik-Jin Kim, MyongChan Hwang & William A. Doebele, Land Readjustment in South Korea, in LAND READJUSTMENT 127, 127 (William A. Doebele ed., 1982).
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CDC is endowed with the power of eminent domain by the state.129
Formed in the wake of the urban riots of the 1960s, CDCs are nonprofit corporations dedicated to the improvement of economically depressed neighborhoods. CDCs resemble LADs to the extent that both
aspire to represent the values and preferences of the residents within
their jurisdictions. Typically, CDCs make some effort to represent local residents on the CDCs’ boards, sometimes even holding elections
among the neighbors to ensure such representation.130
CDCs, however, differ from LADs in one critical respect: CDCs do
not make a single high-stakes decision that focuses the attention and
homogenizes the interests of the constituency that they purport to represent. Instead, CDCs perform a wide variety of low-visibility tasks
such as lobbying for infrastructure and better services from the city,
providing affordable housing, and aiding local businesses. The range
of CDCs’ activities ensures that their constituents’ interests are not
likely to be homogeneous, and the low visibility of their decisions ensures that the turnout at CDC elections will be small. The Dudley
Street Neighborhood Initiative, for instance, managed to rouse only
100-odd residents to vote for its board members, even though its
decisions affected the Roxbury area of Boston, containing 24,000 people.131 Indeed, it is a common criticism of CDCs that they do an imperfect job of actually mobilizing the constituencies that they purport
to represent.132
LADs, by contrast, focus the residents’ minds on a single, dramatic
decision that no one can afford to ignore: the sale of the neighborhood.
The narrowness of the decision increases the neighbors’ homogeneity
of interest, while the impact ensures that they will likely show up to
vote. One might, on these grounds, prefer LADs to CDCs. This is not
to say that CDCs would play no role in the formation of LADs. CDCs
would be prime candidates for organizing neighbors to form LADs
dedicated to the purpose of creating low-income housing or other benefits desired by the community. The difference between eminent domain via a CDC and a LAD, however, is that the residents whose land
was condemned would themselves receive shares of the revenue from
the condemnation and would have a majority veto over the actual de–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
129
130

See Johnson, supra note 84, at 492–97.
See NEIL S. MAYER, NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: MAKING REVITALIZATION WORK 42–43 (1984); PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR,
STREETS OF HOPE: THE FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD 58–60 (1994) (describing elections for the board of the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative).
131 See MEDOFF & SKLAR, supra note 130, at 59, 319. But see id. at 59 (relating story of resident who took great pains to vote).
132 See, e.g., Ram A. Cnaan, Neighborhood-Representing Organizations: How Democratic Are
They?, 65 SOC. SERV. REV. 614, 621 (1991); Randy Stoecker, The CDC Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Critique and an Alternative, 19 J. URB. AFF. 1, 8–10 (1997).
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cision to condemn. To the extent that one worried that CDCs answered more to the private foundations that supplied their funds and
less to the residents who were imperfectly represented on the CDCs’
boards, this difference might be deemed an improvement.
3. LADs, RCAs, CICs, and Condos. — The most successful intermediate-level property institution of the last half-century has been the
condominium, also called the residential community association (RCA)
or the common interest community (CIC). These institutions provide
for an ever-increasing share of American housing, now with about
250,000 associations housing approximately fifty million people.133
They occupy a niche above the level of individual ownership. Although their status as a “private” form of property is sometimes contested, they operate below the lowest level of public control. Because
of their ubiquity, familiarity, and success, they provide the most ready
analogy for building new group property forms, particularly due to
their democratic self-governance mechanisms and autonomy-based
protections for exit.
We draw much of the decisionmaking apparatus for LADs from
the well-developed law of condominiums. However, the analogy
breaks down at several important points, which requires us to look
further afield in designing a new mechanism. Most importantly, condominiums are created ex ante, by a single developer who writes the
rules134 and who has a strong incentive to maximize the value of the
development as a whole. In writing those rules, usually the developer
attracts a relatively homogeneous set of initial owners, each of whom
voluntarily elects to become a member of that community.135 With
their repeated interactions over time, owners develop a densely textured set of informal norms that supplement the formal rules.
Unlike condominiums, LADs are retrofitted ex post to an existing
community — not even necessarily a self-identified community, but
rather one that may be identified ad hoc for redevelopment by an outsider. Along with retrofitting comes heterogeneity. Existing noncondominium communities typically comprise an array of commercial and
residential uses, owners and renters, who may have quite opposing attitudes toward selling based on their wealth, tax position, cash flow
needs, and so on. Because selling is a one-shot decision with a huge
financial consequence, informal norms cannot be relied on to play
much of a role in smoothing over conflict in LADs. Designing a governance mechanism that can be retrofitted onto a developer-defined,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
133
134

Nancy Kubasek, From the Environment, 33 REAL EST. L.J. 203, 203 (2004).
See Wayne S. Hyatt, Condominium and Home Owner Associations: Formation and Development, 24 EMORY L.J. 977, 979–83 (1975) (describing the process of creating condominiums and
the rule-making power of developers).
135 See id.
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heterogeneous community for a high-stakes, one-time decision poses
design challenges that the condominium example cannot meet.
LADs, however, reduce the dangers of intra-group exploitation considerably because the only decision for the group is to accept or reject
a purchase price for the neighborhood. Of course, there will still be
differences in the group members’ priorities — especially the difference between investment- and use-oriented owners, as the former
might be quicker to sell than the latter. But this single division of interest might be easier to manage than the multiple differences that
would emerge if the residents of a LAD had to interact over several
different transactions.
4. LADs, BIDs, BLIDs, and PNAs. — Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) provide a less familiar but also successful analogy, one
with the benefit of demonstrating how a group property institution can
be retrofitted onto an existing community. BIDs are territoriallydefined districts within a city, usually created on the initiative of business owners, that collect funds from all BID members and spend them
on supplementing city services. They can be used to provide additional security, manage parking lots, or improve streetlights and
benches. BIDs provide a useful model for structuring enabling legislation, drawing district boundaries, establishing voting procedures to
protect dissenting owners, and collecting, controlling, and accounting
for funds. On the other hand, the BID analogy loses some force because the financial stakes are relatively low, benefits are easily monitored to ensure that there is no covert redistribution, and everyone is
engaging in repeat play. Even with these advantages, BIDs are kept
on an extraordinarily tight leash: states typically give BIDs minimal
powers to issue bonds or raise revenue with assessments, perhaps because the heterogeneity of property owners within BIDs gives rise to
high levels of conflict.136
Recently, Professor Robert Ellickson proposed block-level improvement districts (BLIDs), essentially a residential equivalent of
BIDs that would retrofit existing residential communities to enable
them to acquire the same types of local public goods available in condominiums, such as better landscaping and security.137 As with BIDs,
BLIDs would pay particular attention to protecting the rights of dissenting landowners, who could be obliged to pay into a new district
without their consent.138
Professor Robert Nelson has worked out the most ambitious proposal for creating a new group property form for managing land. His
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
136
137

See Briffault, supra note 12, at 384–85.
Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 97–98
(1998).
138 See id. at 100–04 (describing BLID formation procedures and voting requirements).
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form of a Private Neighborhood Association (PNA) would in essence
operate as a general purpose condominium that neighbors could retrofit on their existing community.139 Created by concurrent supermajorities of existing owners and renters of residential and commercial
property, a PNA would be able to coerce individual owners to join.140
Like a condominium, a PNA board would have the power to sell
changes in use, including selling the community as a whole for redevelopment — a sort of “LADs plus” property form.141
But this mechanism has not proven easy for Professor Nelson to
sell to legislatures, perhaps because his vision more or less involves
privatizing a substantial part of the city’s zoning power.142 Quite
apart from the problem of spillover effects, the opportunities for intragroup exploitation are high in a neighborhood composed of differentsized structures serving different functions. The possibility that residential owners would burden commercial structures with onerous restrictions is matched only by the possibility that commercial owners
would burden residential owners with noxious uses. Even among
residential owners, the owners of large and small buildings would have
persistently different interests that would invite intra-neighborhood
squabbling.
LADs avoid this problem of intra-group conflict by simplifying the
members’ interest in the LAD’s decision. Because LADs are not responsible for the ongoing management of different land uses, differences arising from those uses will generally be irrelevant to the LAD’s
operation. Again, the one-shot deal is a blessing as well as a curse: it
reduces the capacity, but also the need, for intra-group cooperation.
5. LADs and Corporate “Freezeouts.” — The problem of corporate
“freezeouts” provides one of the closer analogies to LADs, because, like
a LAD, a “freezeout” involves a private party forcing other private
parties to sell an asset against their will. In the freezeout, a controlling
shareholder uses its power over the corporate decisionmaking process
to force other shareholders to divest their voting shares in exchange for
cash or nonvoting stock.143 There is a debate in corporate law literature about whether the forced buyout of minority shareholders serves
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
139 See Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 833–
34 (1999) (listing five parts of the PNA plan).
140 See id. at 834 (requiring a vote of 90% of the total value of the neighborhood and 75% of
the unit owners to agree to the formation of a PNA).
141 See id. at 848–49 (discussing “selling of zoning”); id. at 872–73 (describing how the PNA
proposal allows neighborhoods to decide for themselves how to use land).
142 See id. at 872–73.
143 For an overview of freezeouts, see ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW §§ 12.1–
12.2 (1986).
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any valid corporate purpose.144 But the analogy to LADs is straightforward. Like the controlling shareholder, the landowner(s) within a
LAD who control a majority of the property (measured by valuation,
square footage, etc.), can force the owners of a minority share of the
land to sell their interest against their will. In either case, the controlling shareholder or landowner effectively has a power of private eminent domain.
What can one learn about LADs from the corporate context?
LADs have one advantage over corporate freezeouts: unlike the controlling shareholder, the controlling landowners in a LAD must divest
themselves of their land at the same time that they force the other
landowners to sell. Therefore, assuming that the controlling landowners have no secret affiliation with the assembler-buyer, the dissenting
minority and the majority will both receive the benefits of the assembly. By contrast, the chief objections to a corporate freezeout are
rooted in the controlling shareholder’s continued stake in the enterprise following the forced sale of the minority interest. For instance, it
is sometimes argued that the market price paid to the minority shareholders will not reflect the true value of the stock, either because the
controlling shareholder will suppress inside information about the
company until after the freezeout or because the market price will anticipate self-dealing by the controlling shareholder after the
freezeout.145 But LADs require that the controlling landowners liquidate their interest in the neighborhood at the same time that they force
the minority to liquidate its interest: lacking any interest in the postassembly neighborhood, the controlling landowner cannot transfer
wealth from minority landowners to itself. This one-shot deal destroys
any continuing relationship between the neighborhood and the
neighbors, thus eliminating an avenue for redistribution present in the
corporate context.
Joint-stock corporations, however, have an important advantage
over LADs: the interests of shareholders are more homogeneous than
the interests of landowners. Shareholders large and small generally
hold stock as an investment and place little subjective value on it
above market value. Therefore, if a controlling shareholder’s decision
to take the company private by buying back the minority’s shares
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
144 Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 705–08 (1982) (describing possible business gains stemming from freezeouts), with
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354, 1357 (1978) (describing freezeouts as objectionable because they are “coercive: minority
stockholders are bound by majority rule to accept cash or debt in exchange for their common
shares, even though the price they receive may be less than the value they assign to those shares”).
145 See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 31–34 (2005) (describing
ways in which a majority shareholder can affect market value paid to minority shareholders in a
freezeout).
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maximizes the value of the company, the minority shareholders
should benefit from the decision without making any special sacrifice.146 By contrast, if an investment-oriented landowner — say, a
REIT — were to force the sale of a neighborhood over the objections
of longtime residents, then the latter might have to sacrifice their special valuation of their parcels. Even if the controlling landowner’s decision really did maximize the overall value of the neighborhood and
even if the residents’ gain from the assembly premium exceeded their
lost subjective value, they might still feel that they were forced to
bear a disproportionate burden. In short, the difference in interest between investment-oriented landowners and landowners who use their
land as a business or residence could lead to acrimonious politics and
resentment.
What could be done to increase the LADs’ homogeneity of interests
and thereby make LADs’ politics more harmonious? One possible reform is suggested by the bankruptcy code. In bankruptcy, different
classes of creditors (defined by the nature of their security interest and
priority) vote separately to approve a reorganization plan.147 The plan
is not approved unless concurrent majorities of each class approve
it.148 By analogy, one might attempt to divide landowners into classes
based on their attachment to the neighborhood, requiring concurrent
majorities of each class for approval of the assembly. Investmentoriented landowners such as REITs and lenders holding foreclosed security interests in land could compose one class, while landowners who
occupied their real estate for business or residential use could compose
the other class. Neither could unilaterally force a sale of the neighborhood without the consent of the other.
The idea of concurrent majorities, however, faces administrative
hurdles that might make it impractical. It is not easy, for instance, to
classify landowners as passive investors or active users, given that
land can simultaneously be a factor of production, a consumption item,
and an investment. A simpler proposal that might accomplish the
same objective would be prohibiting any landowner from casting a
percentage of votes above a minority ceiling of, say, thirty percent.
This limit on voting power would prevent any single landowner from
purchasing a majority share of a neighborhood with an eye to selling
the assembled neighborhood over the objections of the other landowners. As a practical matter, this ban on single controlling landowners
might ensure that investors with only a transient interest in a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
146 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 144, at 704 (“[I]f the terms under which the directors
obtain control of the firm call for them to maximize the wealth of the investors, their duty is to
select the highest-paying venture . . . .”).
147 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2000).
148 Id. § 1126(c).
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neighborhood could not use LADs to dominate the assembly decision
and ignore the preferences of more permanent residents.
6. LADs and Class Actions. — Like LADs, class actions constitute
a system of collective governance for a one-shot deal. Class actions
aggregate the common interests of plaintiffs in litigation, allowing one
attorney to represent all of the interests of the class. The purpose of
this joint representation is to overcome a familiar collective action
problem in managing a common-pool resource: if the cost of maintaining a common-pool resource exceeds any individual’s benefit from the
resource, then each individual will have an incentive to shirk in doing
his or her share to maintain the resource, even if the collective benefits
of the resource exceed the collective costs of maintenance.149 Absent
some centralized mechanism for forcing the beneficiaries to contribute
a share of the costs, the resource will be neglected.
In the context of a class action, the common-pool resource is successful litigation. Because “small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights,”150 plaintiffs with small stakes might each have insufficient reason to hire a lawyer to vindicate their claims, even if the sum of their
claims would justify the expense of attorneys’ fees. Since such claims
might share common legal issues, a single attorney could advance everyone’s claim, if only the plaintiffs could figure out a way to divide the
cost of representation. Class actions provide such a mechanism, in
which dissenters have a limited right to opt out.
The analogy to LADs is again straightforward. LADs address the
common-pool resource of land assembly. Landowners lack the incentive to maintain this resource through cooperative action, even when
the benefits exceed the costs of cooperation. LADs force every landowner to participate in the assembly, giving dissenters a limited right
to opt out for just compensation.
But the specific nature of the collective action problem explains
why class actions suffer from agency costs that are largely missing in
LADs. The small stakes that give rise to the need for class actions also
make it unlikely that claimants will closely monitor the lawyer representing them. Not being closely monitored by rationally apathetic
class members, this lawyer will have an incentive to collude with the
defendants against whom he is supposed to be litigating, settling for a

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
149 This problem has been familiar at least since the eighteenth century when Hume examined
the dilemma of meadow drainage. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 345
(David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2000) (1740).
150 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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small recovery but high fees.151 Ensuring faithful representation from
the class’s lawyer, therefore, becomes a major focus of class action
jurisprudence.152
Agent faithlessness is less of a difficulty for LADs, because the collective action problem of LADs does not arise out of the constituents’
small stakes. Rather, land assembly suffers from the opposite problem:
each landowner refuses to cooperate in order to extort from the others
the entire value of the common-pool resource, that is, the assembly
surplus.153 This collective action problem need not give rise to rational apathy on the part of landowners, because the landowners have
large and usually undiversified assets at stake in any land assembly —
their homes and businesses. The prospect of losing possession and a
considerable amount of value in one’s largest investment focuses the
mind wonderfully. Unsurprisingly, landowners aggressively participate
in condemnation proceedings and would be unlikely to overlook an inadequate settlement by their agent.
Nevertheless, LADs require some policing of agents akin to the
monitoring of class action lawyers. There is a danger that assemblers
will surreptitiously purchase a controlling share of a neighborhood
through frontmen or dummy corporations. The assembler would then
use those shares to force the remainder of the landowners to accept a
low price for the neighborhood. Although landowners are likely to be
alert, they might nevertheless be unable to detect a covert relationship
between a controlling landowner and the assembler. To forestall such
conflicts of interest, LAD-enabling legislation should require especially
stringent disclosure requirements and bar any landowner from voting
in a LAD if that landowner has any affiliation with the assembler.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
151 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 854–55 (1995).
152 See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP.
CT. REV. 337, 351–52.
153 Thus, land assembly is akin to the “limited fund” class action under FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(1)(B), in which claimants must all simultaneously establish their rights to some limited fund
in order for any claimant to recover. The requirement of joint action gives each an incentive to
hold out for an excessive share of the fund.
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7. Summary. — Table 3 below summarizes how LADs fit in with a
broad array of devices for governing common-pool resources.
TABLE 3. KEY FEATURES AND LESSONS
FROM ANALOGOUS INSTITUTIONS
Institution
Land
Readjustment

CDC

Condo,
CIC, RCA

BID, BLID,
PNA

Corporate
Freezeouts

Class
Actions

Key Feature
Requires neighbors to
continue interacting; limits
ability of assembler to
purchase entire
neighborhood.
Governs a heterogeneous
set of issues; provides no
high-stakes decision to
focus attention of residents
on CDC decisions.

Comparison to,
and Lessons for, LADs
LADs provide more radical
transformation of neighborhood by conferring greater
discretion on landowners.

LADs provide greater incentives for neighbor
participation and fewer risks
of majority exploitation of
minority interests in
neighborhood.
Voluntary institution that
LADs govern a more
governs self-selected
heterogeneous, less selfmembers who must interact selected constituency that,
over a long period of time
therefore, may be more prone
and broad range of issues.
to intra-group conflict and
exploitation. However, a oneshot deal may also constrain
opportunities for exploitation.
Ex post institution that
LADs govern a less extensive
works because of
and durable set of issues,
homogeneous interests and reducing likelihood of intralimited powers.
group exploitation. Use
voting rules for formation and
termination to limit coercion
of dissenters.
Controlling shareholder can Requirement that controlling
force minority to sell
landowner sells interest in
interest while retaining its
land limits power to
own interest.
redistribute wealth. Perhaps
add limits on a landowner’s
power to act alone.
Retrofits governance
Focus on ways to ensure agent
mechanism on diverse range fidelity to principals, perhaps
of underlying interests for
using public/court supervision
one-shot resolution.
and disclosure requirements.
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In some respects, LADs can learn from their elders, borrowing reforms needed in corporate law, bankruptcy, and condominiums to ensure that the commons can be governed without exploitation. We argue that the track record of these other group property forms suggests
one conclusion with confidence: LADs are worth a try.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law governing land assembly for economic development is a
mess. We have failed to come up with good solutions either through
private contracting, which leads to holdouts and underassembly, or
through public regulation, which leads to transparently politicized, coercive, and confiscatory condemnations. Courts have not fared better:
jurisprudence regarding public use and “just compensation” provides
too crude a tool to constrain legislatures and to generate either fair or
efficient solutions. In sum, current approaches to land assembly provoke widespread hostility, discredit both courts and legislatures, and
cost society a staggering amount in forgone social value.
LADs are the solution, so long as one accepts our premise that
those burdened by condemnation should be able to share more directly
in some of its benefits. To function well, LADs must address all the
concerns raised by any “liberal commons” property form, including the
spheres of individual dominion, democratic self-government, and
community-enhancing exit.154 Closely analogous liberal commons
forms, such as BIDs and land readjustment, provide much of the
LADs’ needed governance mechanisms, though they must be tailored
to account for the specific values people bring to land assembly. By
forcing owners to reveal their reserve price, LADs promote efficient
assemblies and deter inefficient ones. And by letting neighbors bargain for assembly gains, LADs can mitigate the unfairness surrounding
condemnation.
Property rights entrepreneurs add value by identifying how private
contracting and public regulation interact to create social welfare costs,
and by engineering solutions to these seemingly intractable collective
action dilemmas. More generally, LADs illustrate how property rights
innovation can and should operate.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
154

See Dagan & Heller, supra note 67.

